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ABSTRACT
The United States Health Care sector is a large and growing segment of the
US economy. Herein, I present three distinct research projects regarding aspects
of that industry, especially how it responds to public policy and government pro-
grams. I focus primarily on the hospital sector, and the Medicare Advantage mar-
ket. Additionally, I explore how ownership type-publicly owned versus for-profits,
for example–behave differently.
I investigate the relative efficiency of different ownership types in the US hospital
industry. Earlier studies neglect the differential ability of the hospital types to choose
their own market. We use a Dubin-McFadden approach to solve the endogeneity
problem and estimate hospital efficiencies for each ownership type. Efficiencies are
estimated using stochastic frontier analysis. Results indicate that accounting for
location choice does affect estimates of efficiency and that for-profit hospitals have
a relative advantage in smaller markets while public hospitals have a slight edge in
larger markets.
Next, I study entry decisions of insurance plans participating in the Medicare
Advantage program. I use the prevailing models of entry to compare how for profit
and non-profit insurance firms differentially emphasize the characteristics of potential
markets. I also determine how the preferential treatment of non-profits affects the
composition of markets and whether governments should adjust their treatment to
encourage or discourage non-profit entry. Results indicate that non-profit insurance
companies are more responsive to higher payment rates which suggests that they act
more like for-profit firms than altruistic organizations.
Finally, I estimate the how much net welfare, Medicare Advantage contributes
ii
to the US economy. I use the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey to estimate
a discrete choice model of beneficiaries’ choice of traditional Medicare, Medigap,
and Medicare Advantage. I use the results to calculate the net welfare; I find that
Medicare Advantages, on net, increased social welfare by 7.76 billion dollars in 2005.
iii
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NOMENCLATURE
CMS Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
MA Medicare Advantage
ARF Area Resource File
HHS Health and Human Services
HRSA Health Resources and Services Administration
MCBS Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey
OOP Out of Pocket
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1. INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH
The United States Health Care sector comprises the interactions of consumers,
firms, and the government in several capacities. Firms in different industries work as
both consumers and providers and can be organized to earn profits or to altruistically
provide services to those who need them. The government, too, plays different
roles at different times. The Federal government acts as an insurer with Medicare
but also subsidizes health care for low-income Americans through Medicaid. Local
governments sometimes set up hospitals when their citizens are under-served.
With all of these relationships co-existing in different industries creating such a
multifarious system that at its core is meant to merely provide a service to citizens,
opportunities to explore the benefits and costs of different aspects abound. In my
dissertation, each section concentrates on a separate industry within the health care
sector: hospitals, insurance, and Medicare Advantage. In the first two sections, I
explore the differences between different ownership types, and in the third I explore
the benefits of the Medicare Advantage program–a program meant to orient private
firms to public goals.
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2. SELECTING INTO EFFICIENCY IN THE US HOSPITAL MARKET
2.1 Introduction
Economists have long studied how the performance of publicly-owned firms com-
pares to that of conventional firms–private firms run for profit. Though in most
settings, for-profit firms are best able to provide goods and services in a way that
enhances social welfare, in certain circumstances, particular features might dampen
their advantages. In this paper, we investigate the relative performance of three
types of firms–public, non-profit, and for-profit–in the hospital industry. We find
that the market in which the firm operates is an integral factor in the analysis, and
that though for-profit firms outperform their counterparts in the smallest markets,
public firms perform just as well as private in the largest.
Public firms seem to have several potential advantages over their counterparts:
lower tax rates, favorable legislation, and altruistic employees to name a few. The
advantages of the for-profit firms, derived from the self-interested motives of owners,
seem to outweigh those of government-managed firms in most industries. The First
Fundamental Welfare Theorem predicts that private, for-profit firms will lead to
maximum social welfare, but if certain conditions aren’t met–perfect competition,
absence of externalities, absence of information asymmetry to name a few–welfare
may not be maximized.
The hospital industry fails two of the requirements for the First Fundamental Wel-
fare Theorem–asymmetric information and (in many markets) lack of competition.
Past research on which ownership type outperforms the other has had mixed results;
unsurprisingly, the answer depends significantly on the specifics of the question–
which industry, which setting, which measure of performance?
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Additionally, even within a single industry, there may not be a single answer; one
ownership type might perform better only in certain circumstances. For example,
different competitive environments might have different effects on the efficiency of
firms depending on their ownership type. Furthermore, the incentives that go along
with each ownership type may also complicate the measurement of their performance.
We explore these issues within the hospital industry. Hospitals foster a great deal
of analysis because the industry operates in a diverse set of environments–hospitals
exist in both rural and urban areas, in monopolies and competitive markets, and with
large and small capacities. Additionally, they are organized under three different
ownership types.
The health care industry makes up a significant proportion (16%) of the US
economy, and it is expected to continue growing in the future. Hospitals are the
primary conduit through which consumers participate in the health care industry.
Though the size of the industry makes it important, one aspect that makes it unique is
its inclusion of different ownership types. In this paper we explore which ownership
type operates most efficiently. Though many have previously studied this issue,
we will address the complicating effects that hospitals’ incentives (and how they’re
manifested in location choice) will have on the estimates.
The hospital industry is the only industry characterized by considerable compe-
tition between firms that are operated by government (at multiple levels), not-for-
profit organizations, and for-profit enterprises. This aberration developed because
early hospitals focused on the indigent. Serving this population proved not very
profitable and, therefore, was eschewed by for-profit firms and, therefore, dominated
by public and non-profit hospitals. As the industry matured and evolved, however,
hospitals expanded to serve a larger segment of the population, but non-profit and
public hospitals continued to dominate Starr (1982). Many argued that information
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asymmetries explained their persistence, but perhaps the for-profit hospitals needed
more time to react. Indeed, over the past few decades, for-profit hospitals have
become a significant participant in the hospital industry.
Of course, for-profit hospitals likely have different incentives than public and non-
profit hospitals and, therefore, will behave differently. Many examples of different
behaviors are discussed below. We will focus on how these hospitals have different
incentives and constraints when choosing where to locate and how their motivations
may bias our evaluation of their performance.
The measure of performance that this paper focuses on will be technical efficiency,
or how well the hospital can minimize its cost. We will use Stochastic Frontier Anal-
ysis (SFA) on data from a national sample of hospitals to determine each hospital’s
distance from the cost frontier. Also, we will estimate the model in a two-step
discrete/continuous method to address the bias caused by the ability of for-profit
hospitals to choose the markets they serve. We employ the hospital cost reports
provided by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
We find that in the uncorrected data, for-profit hospitals are more efficient than
public, and public are more efficient than non-profits in all markets. Once we con-
trol for their location choices, however, we find that for-profit hospitals continue
to perform better than the other types in smaller markets, but public hospitals and
for-profit hospital efficiency are not significantly different in the largest markets. Ad-
ditionally, non-profits and public hospitals operate at similar levels of efficiency in
medium-sized markets.
In other words, the ability and inclination of firms to choose in which market
they operate biases our measurements of their performance, and different ownership
types’ ability to provide services at the lowest cost depends on the market in which
they operate. Though an analysis that controls for only ownership type may result
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in a single ordering, this obscures the more complicated truth that each has its
advantages in different settings and it fails to consider that firms’ location choice
might bias measurements of their performance.
2.2 Literature
Economists have long been interested in the motivations of for-profit firms and
wondered if they are consistent with social welfare maximization. Could publicly
owned enterprises better promote social welfare if the incentives were aligned? Do
non-profits offer a combination of the other two types’ best aspects? The health
industry offers a fertile battleground to test these ideas.
Alchian (1965) proposed the earliest and most influential theory regarding own-
ership and efficiency. Basically, he argued that because the owners of a public firm
(citizens) couldn’t easily transfer their ownership claims, specialized owners would
be unable to gain control of the firm and manage it efficiently. Scores of studies in
the ensuing years in several industries attempted to test this notion without reaching
a consensus. Caves and Christensen (1980) argued that the competitive environment
could compel public firms to operate as efficiently as private, and again subsequent
economists found evidence for and against their hypothesis.
For hospitals in particular, several papers have proposed models for how non-
profit hospitals operate–what incentives they face and their objectives. For example,
Newhouse (1970) suggested that each of the parties involved in the operation of a non-
profit hospital have different motivations and participate in a constant struggle to
direct the hospital. The government that bestows upon it special privileges desires it
to serve as many citizens as possible–quantity maximization. On the other hand, the
Board that oversees the hospital may solicit donations to the hospital by advertising
its “prestige,” which may be tied to both the quantity produced and the quality
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of the product. The medical staff, also, has its own interest in both quantity and
quality. Consequently, the final objective of the non-profit hospital is a compromise
between the different stakeholders.
In his model, the non-profit firms do not minimize costs because the incentives
will push non-profits to over-emphasize quality (compared to a for-profit hospital).
Therefore, the presence of public or non-profit firms will drive the equilibrium away
from the social optimum. The high barriers to hospital entry also prevent entry
pressure from disciplining the non-profits and public hospitals as in other industries.
Pauly and Redisch (1973) proposed an alternative model for non-profit hospitals.
They posited that the medical staff, namely the doctors, had unfettered control of
the hospital and that they acted to maximize their own net incomes, i.e. a physi-
cians’ cooperative. This arrangement would mimic a for-profit enterprise because the
physicians would have the incentive to maximize the economic residual as it would
accrue to them. This case leads to similar outcomes as in the Newhouse model–
overemphasis on quality and duplication of several services. Ultimately, however, it
relies on the assumption that the physicians are the only decision-makers involved
in supply.
Once the models were in place, economists began to compare the performance of
the hospital types to ascertain which model better fit the outcomes. Over time, the
methods have evolved to be more sophisticated, moving from direct comparisons of
raw outcomes to regression analysis to frontier methods. At no stage did they find
consistent behavior in terms of cost efficiency across ownership types. Sloan (2000)
discusses the most prominent papers during the pre-frontier era.
The regression analysis gave way to frontier approaches in the early 1980s. In
the frontier approach, a production (or cost) frontier is estimated to determine the
most cost-effective way to provide a certain amount of output. Then the hospital’s
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distance from the frontier determines its efficiency. The two primary frontier-based
methods, Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic Frontier Analysis, have both
been used in numerous studies. In the past decade, SFA has become more dominant
in the hospital efficiency literature.
The first two to apply it to hospitals, Stephen Zuckerman (1994) and Vitaliano
and Toren (1996), find mixed results. The former finds that while public and non-
profit hospitals have similar efficiencies, they both outperform for-profits. The latter
finds that all three ownership types are equally adept (or inept) at minimizing costs.
Also, while Stephen Zuckerman (1994) was primarily interested in ownership’s effect
on performance, Vitaliano and Toren (1996) focused on other variables but included
ownership as a control. Both of these papers used a two-step method wherein the
frontier is estimated in the first step, and the inefficiencies are regressed on other
determinants in a second step; later researchers pointed out that this procedure is
biased, however. Like Vitaliano and Toren (1996), many other researchers include
ownership type in their analyses though it’s not their primary interest. The results
of these studies suggest no clear relationship between ownership type and efficiency.
When comparing the performance of three different ownership types, there are
thirteen possible orderings (six distinct orderings, six orderings where two of the three
types are statistically the same, and one where all three types are statistically the
same). Of the seventeen analyses conducted in the listed papers, twelve compared all
three types, and seven different orderings were reported. The remaining five analyses
compared only non-profit hospitals and for-profit hospitals. With only two ownership
types, there are only three possible orderings; all three possibilities were reported in
at least one study.
Some studies Carey (2003), Chirikos and Sear (2000), McKay and Deily (2005),
Folland and Hofler (2001), Li and Rosenman (2001), McKay and Dorner (2002),
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Rosko (1999), Sloan (2000), and Stephen Zuckerman (1994) look at a national sample
of all hospitals, while others focus on certain geographic areas or types of hospitals:
Rosko and Mutter (2010) look at Critical Access Hospitals; Ozcan and Haksever
(1992) look at urban hospitals; Vitaliano and Toren (1996) concentrate on hospitals
in New York state. These papers also differ in their methodology, some use DEA
and some use SFA with the two-step procedure to determine the contributors to
inefficiency.
What none of these analyses consider, however, is the varying amounts of control
over seemingly exogenous sources of variation these ownership types have. For exam-
ple, if hospitals exhibit positive returns to scale, then hospitals with more admissions
will appear more efficient than low-admission hospitals. This wouldn’t be a problem
if the different types of hospitals were equally likely to locate in areas across the
admissions spectrum. However, for-profit and public hospitals, in particular, have
vastly different entry philosophies: for-profit hospitals can choose areas that have
high expected profits, while public hospitals are generally established in areas that
lack hospital service. This is borne out in the data, where we see that public hospitals
tend to serve smaller communities and for-profits larger communities. Non-profits
could be expected to behave either like for-profits or like public hospitals depending
on the objectives of its donors and/or managers. Regardless, this complication makes
the location endogenous.
To address this endogeneity, we use the approach developed in Dubin and McFad-
den (1984), wherein the first step is a discrete choice model and the second step uses
the predicted results from the first step as instrumental variables. Though applied
to electricity consumption in the original paper, since then, it has been extended to
answer diverse questions; fuel economy, (Goldberg (1998) and Feng, Fullerton and
Gan (2005)), finance (Fohlin (1998)), and labor (Seitz (2009)) to name just a few
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examples.
Several economists have applied this methodology to the health care sector. Most
commonly it is used in the context of how the quantity of health services purchased
relates to the choice of insurance provider–for example, Cameron et al. (1988), Car-
don and Hendel (2001), and Mello, Stearns and Norton (2002). While Cardon and
Hendel (2001) focused primarily on the role of adverse selection, Cameron et al.
(1988) also looked at moral hazard. Mello, Stearns and Norton (2002) were inter-
ested in determining to what extent HMOs reduce the resource demands of their
insurees.
The objective of this paper is to determine how the choice of location influences
the efficiency estimates of the different ownership types. We will use a discrete choice
model to estimate the likelihood that hospitals will locate in different market types,
and then use the probabilities as IVs in a stochastic frontier framework. By doing
this we will neutralize the bias caused by the endogeneity of location choice.
2.3 The Model
2.3.1 Cost Function
Stochastic Frontier Analysis has been used to study hospitals for decades. As
such, there are innumerable variations of the models used. At its most basic level
SFA estimates a cost function for the hospital industry and infers the inefficiency
of the hospital from the residual. Rosko and Mutter (2008) provide a survey of the
methods and techniques of some of the analyses to identify common/best practices.
The basic equation that we will estimate is
ln costsi = C(Yi,Wi, Xi) + vi + ui (2.1)
where Yi denotes outputs, Wi denotes input prices, and Xi denotes quality descrip-
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tors. vi represents the stochastic component of the costs while ui represents a the
distance from the cost frontier for that hospital.




























Rosko and Mutter (2008) find that both the translog and the Cobb-Douglas
specifications generally lead to the same results.1 we use the translog because of its
flexibility, its primacy, and its ability to include multiple outputs. Also, many choose
Cobb-Douglas when they have few degrees of freedom to spare, but generally that is
not a problem when using a national sample of hospitals. Finally, studies have found
that though the choice of cost function may affect absolute measures of inefficiency, it
doesn’t affect the relative inefficiencies of the firms. Because we are most interested
in the relative measures of inefficiency, the choice’s repercussions will be limited.
For outputs, we use outpatient visits and total admissions. We excluded patient
days because of the high correlation with admissions. While previous literature
frequently includes more outputs, we feel that outpatient visits and admissions are
the primary descriptors of hospital output and additional variables will only provide
marginally more information. As no consensus has emerged regarding the use of
other variables, and there are no clear arguments in favor of any other particular
variables, the inclusion of other variables is not required.
The input prices include both the labor price (wages plus benefits divided by
1This may not be the case when the residuals are regressed on causes of inefficiency. See Battese
and Broca (1997).
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full-time employees) and the price of capital (the sum of depreciation and interest
expense divided by the number of beds). These two prices are included in nearly
every analysis of hospital performance and are the only indicators of price included,
owing largely to the scarcity of alternatives. To ensure homogeneity of degree one in
input prices, the cost function is normalized by the price of labor.
Because hospitals’ efficiency could be largely influenced by the severity of the
patients it sees and the quality of the hospital itself, it becomes important to control
for these dimensions. For quality, the most commonly included variables are hospital
accreditation status, risk-adjusted mortality rate, and teaching status. Due to data
limitations we include only teaching status. While we have the option of providing
a continuous measure (such as interns per bed), this has the unwelcome side effect
of being endogenous. The alternative, a teaching dummy is not without downsides
either; it suggests that hospitals that train doctors are inherently of a different quality
than non-teaching hospitals.
Hospital systems exist ostensibly to help reduce the costs of operating hospitals by
relying on economies of scale. Hospitals joining or creating systems almost uniformly
motivate their decision by appealing to the cost reduction potential of the integration,
though Carey (2003) notes that the evidence supporting this supposition is mixed at
best. Regardless, it is important to include it as a contributor to the cost function
because it’s a structural parameter that will likely have a significant impact on how
the hospital is managed.
It is also necessary to account for the mixture of patients that seek treatment.
Almost all analyses use the Medicare Case Mix Index (CMI) to account for diversity
of cases seen. This has been found to explain away a significant portion of estimated
inefficiency. Additional product descriptors only marginally improve the estimated
efficiency, and indices of severity have been found to be highly correlated with the
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case mix index so need not be included either.
To our knowledge, no previous study has included variables describing the market
size, let alone interactions between market size and ownership type. We expect that
increased market size should have a negative effect on inefficiency for all ownership
types.
2.3.2 Inefficiency Term
Finally, we must choose a distribution for the error terms. vi accounts for shocks
to costs outside the control of management and will be standard normal as per com-
mon practice. ui represents the deviation from the cost frontier and is assumed to be
positive. Generally, analysts choose either a truncated normal or a truncated expo-
nential distribution. Rosko and Mutter (2008) found that choice of error distribution
had little effect on results. We chose to use the truncated normal distribution as it
allows for external variables to affect the efficiency directly. This is done by allowing
the parameters of the normal distribution to be determined by these variables.
Using this procedure is an alternative to the two-step procedure discussed pre-
viously. Because the elements that affect the efficiency zi are likely correlated with
elements in the cost function xi, estimation of both zi and xi must take place si-
multaneously. Estimating in two stages (where the cost function is estimated first
and the resulting efficiencies are regressed on zi) will bias the first stage estimates
and consequently obviate any second stage. Furthermore, this particular approach
is contradictory; in the first stage, we would assume ui to be identically distributed,
independent of zi but in the second that the efficiency is a function of zi Kumbhakar
and Lovell (2000).
Coelli (1995) proposed a technique to simultaneously estimate both the cost func-
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tion and the efficiency components.
ui = N+(Ziδ, σ2u) (2.3)
Ziδ = Z1iδ1 + Z2iδ2
Basically, it uses for ui a normal distribution truncated at zero with mean Ziδ. So
Zi determines the mean of ui and the point of truncation of ui. In other words, higher
values of δ shift the distribution to the right, expanding the role of ui, the efficiency
component. Larger ui implies that more of the costs are explained by inefficiency.
So larger values of δ imply increased inefficiency.
Equation 2.3 estimates the contributions of different variables to the inefficiency.
z1i represents a set of market-specific control variables (hospital HHI, median income,
average age, and % white) while z2i comprises dummies for the ownership and market
type. The dependent variable will be the total costs of the hospital.
2.3.3 Location Choice
To account for the endogeneity of location choice, the first stage of the estimation
will attempt to estimate hospital entry into markets of different size.




, j = 1, 2, 3, ..., J (2.4)
Equation 2.4 describes the model being estimated. xi represents a set of dummy
variables indicating whether the hospital is classified as a certain type (referral,
transplant, teaching, critical access, all-inclusive payment system, rehabilitation, sole
community, psychiatric, new). The dependent variable in this model, Yi, will be
hospitali’s market type. Market type is determined by the population density of the
market, where a higher value of j denotes higher population density. Specifically, all
markets containing at least one hospital are split into J equally-sized groups. The
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lowest population density market is denoted j = 1, and the market with the highest
population density is denoted j = J .
An alternative method of splitting up the markets would be to divide the counties
into three equal groups. This method implies that hospital creators consider a larger
set of counties when deciding. While it’s appropriate to include all counties in the
decision instead of just counties that already contain hospitals, effectively, it would
compress the counties most likely to be chosen into fewer groups while inhospitable
counties with very few residents would overwhelm the smallest group.
Instead of the multinomial logit model, an ordered probit might be more appro-
priate since the choices are ordered by population density. However, the model used
depends on whether one believes that the hospital has an ideal choice of population
density and then chooses the market that contains that choice or if they are actually
choosing among market types–rural, urban, a mix. We chose to model the latter
option. While others might prefer using the ordered probit, one of the advantages
of the Dubin-McFadden framework is that this choice shouldn’t affect the qualita-
tive outcome because basically the discrete choice portion creates an instrumental
variable, and as long as it’s a valid instrument, it will suffice.2
To restrict the choice set somewhat, the sample of hospitals is split into six
contiguous regions. Theoretically, this suggests that hospital organizers are choosing
which type of market they will enter within a particular region. One must assume
that the hospital decision is similar across regions for this division to be appropriate.
This better approximates the real world since in many cases those who are considering
building hospitals generally focus on fairly localized regions instead of the United
States as a whole. Using the entire nation for the analysis did not alter the results.
2In a robustness check, the results were not sensitive to the usage of an ordered probit model in
lieu of multinomial logit.
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This becomes clearer when one considers the rise of hospital chains. Generally
these systems operate on a regional instead of national basis, merging with hospital
systems in neighboring states. Rarely do chains undergo cross-country mergers. As
such, when determining where to build new hospitals they focus on regions where
they already have considerable market information by either filling in a gap in their
coverage or expanding to neighboring communities. Cuellar and Gertler (2003) point
out that though hospital systems consider geographic risk diversification beneficial,
the difficulty with managing separate hospitals in such diverse markets outweighs
the benefit.
The data allow for a cursory check of this claim. The hospital can specify whether
it is a member of a system and then provide the name and address of that system.
Using the data provided, we calculated that the average distance between a hospital
and its system headquarters was 34 miles (the median was less than 2). More than
80% of hospitals were located within 50 miles of the system’s headquarters. Con-
sidering the regions we use span hundreds of miles, there’s probably room for even
further restricting the choices geographically.
The determined coefficients will be used to predict the probability of each hospital
entering each market type. These likelihoods will then be used as instrumental
variables for market types in Equation 2.3. If there is selection bias, then the results
from the two estimations will differ.
We will divide the results into raw and treated. Raw results come from using
market-size dummies directly while treated come from the predicted results of the
discrete choice model. The cost functions as well as the efficiency controls (z1i will
be the same for both. What will differ will be the variables in z2i.
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where ̂popgrpji is the predicted likelihood of hospital i locating in market-type j.
2.4 Data
The hospital data for this analysis come from the Medicare Cost Reports. These
reports are submitted by each hospital approved to receive Medicare reimbursements.
They are submitted annually to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) and contain considerable information about the hospitals; they contain hos-
pital descriptive information such as the name of hospital, location (address), own-
ership type, and a host of other facility descriptors relating to how the government
classifies the hospital. The number of beds is reported as both a total and for each
department. The variables that describe the operation of the hospital: admissions,
outpatients, labor costs, capital costs, other costs, and net income, for example.
Though both more recent and historic data are currently available, in this paper
we use only that from 2009 as it was the most recent finalized set. CMS also provides
estimates for the case mix indices for the nation’s hospitals on an annual basis.
However, the hospitals that submit cost reports to the CMS do not all receive a CMI
figure.
Of the hospital records included, CMS did not report CMI’s for 2270 of them.
Additionally, many hospitals were missing other data from the cost reports. To
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address this issue, all missing data were filled in with zeros with the addition of a
dummy indicating whether the data were missing. Additionally, since the function
was normalized by labor costs, these could not be filled in with zeros. Instead,
labor costs were regressed on county health and demographic characteristics. The
predicted prices were then used in observations where the actual labor cost was
missing. A second dummy variable to indicate the data came from the regression
was also added. This way, all available data could be included in the analysis.
Hospital efficiency estimations generally use either MSA or county as their market
definition. Neither choice is perfect. Using counties creates a geographic choice area
larger than is probable for the decision. Furthermore, it is unlikely that patients
are giving equal weight to regardless of distance when considering which hospital
to use while ignoring hospitals that may be physically closer yet across a political
boundary. Using MSAs still may be too large an area since patients are just as
unlikely to cross a large metropolitan area for emergency needs. We choose to use
counties as the market definition because of the desire to explore the effect of market
size on efficiency. Focusing only on MSAs would limit the scope of the study to only
large, urban markets.
The county data come from the Area Resource File. This dataset is provided by
the US Department of Health and Human Services Health Resources and Services
Administration. It provides medical, geographic, and demographic information for
each county in the United States for certain years from 1980-2009. Of the nation’s
3143 counties, 2345 of them contain at least one hospital.
Table A.1 provides summary statistics of some of the information used in the
analysis split by ownership type. The data above the horizontal line are medians.
It is clear from Table A.1 that non-profit hospitals make up the largest segment
of hospitals (50%) and controls the largest number of beds (47%). The remaining
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hospitals are divided almost evenly between for-profit and public hospitals, but for-
profit hospitals have three times as many beds as public hospitals.
Non-profit hospitals have the highest total costs which isn’t surprising considering
they also serve the most patients. The costs/admission suggest that public hospitals
are the least efficient while non-profits are the most. This is in spite of the fact that
non-profit and for-profit hospitals have more severe patients to treat according to
the CMI.
Generally, for-profit hospitals operate in markets with the most competition and
public hospitals in markets with the least. The population density figures correspond
to the hospital figures; for-profits operate in the most densely populated areas, public
hospitals the least, and non-profits in between. There are 5,380 hospitals in the full
sample.
Figures B.1 and B.2 illustrate the main idea of this paper. Figure B.1 shows
how the proportions of ownership type evolve as market sizes increase. In the most
sparsely populated counties, non-profit and public hospitals overwhelm the hospi-
tal markets. As population density increases, however, while non-profit hospitals
continue to represent between 40 and 50% of the markets, for-profit hospitals dis-
place public hospitals. This suggests that both for-profit and public hospitals choose
their markets differently. We contend that public hospitals operate mostly in smaller
communities because public hospitals’ intentions are to serve the under-served, and
private providers don’t find it in their interest to build hospitals there. For-profit
hospitals, however, choose denser markets because they expect them to be more
profitable than sparse markets.
Table A.2 exhibits the same statistics as Table A.1 but broken down by market
type instead of ownership; it makes the relationship between these figures and the size
of the markets very clear. All the statistics display a monotonic relationship except
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proportion of hospitals, but that division is an artifact of the procedure to divide up
the markets. Notice that costs/admission fall with size of market (reinforcing the
relationship in Figure B.2 and also, that in the smallest markets, the median hospital
faces no competition.
Table A.3 (and Figure B.3) separates the costs/admission by both the market
type and ownership type. Figure B.2 shows that costs/patient are lower in denser
markets. According to these figures, for-profit hospitals treat patients more cheaply
than both non-profit and public hospitals despite the size of the market. However,
both public and non-profit hospitals exhibit a marked decrease in costs from the
smallest to largest markets–45% for non-profits and 44% for publics. For-profit, on
the other hand, falls only 34%. Granted, many factors may be involved here (patient
differences for example); this does support the case, though, that competition is a
primary factor in the ability of firms to achieve higher operational efficiency.
Figure B.2 shows a similar relationship with aggregating the different ownership
types. It, too shows that costs/patient are lower in denser markets, though this could
be driven by the varying ownership composition as markets grow.
Figure B.4 shows the locations of the hospitals in the full sample, their ownership
type, and the population density of the counties that contain them. The map makes
it more clear that hospital density tracks population density. In the lightly populated
western counties, most counties have either zero or one public hospital.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Dubin-McFadden
As discussed previously, we divided the counties into groups based on population,
each with the same number of hospitals. For the baseline specification we used
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three groups.3 The population density cutoffs for the three types were around 70
people/square mile and 500 people/square mile. Each county type contained about
1790 hospitals in the full sample. As expected from Figure B.1, in the smallest
market, non-profits make up 45% of the hospitals, for-profits 15%, and public 40%.
In the medium-size markets the composition is 52/32/16, and in the largest markets
it is 52/36/12.
The regions used to constrain the entry choices of hospitals can be seen in Figure
B.5; they are based on US census regions but modified slightly to maintain similar
numbers of hospitals in each region. The coefficients from the multinomial logit can
be seen in Table A.4.4
They mostly conform to predictions: critical access hospitals are more likely to
be in smaller communities while transplant, teaching, rehabilitation, and psychiatric
hospitals are more likely in larger markets. New hospitals and hospitals that use an
all-inclusive payment system are also more likely to locate in more-populated areas.
Only one coefficient doesn’t necessarily match ex ante expectations–referral hos-
pitals. However, hospitals classified as referral hospitals receive patients from neigh-
boring communities that don’t have the resources to treat all patients. Medicare
classifies hospitals as referral hospitals if they meet 1 of 2 criteria: (1) they surpass
a threshold size (in terms of beds) and are located in a rural area or (2) if more
than 50% of its Medicare patients are referred from other hospitals and 60% of those
referrals are from greater than 25 miles away. This suggests that referral hospitals
would probably gravitate to the smaller markets. Large markets probably receive
most referrals from other hospitals that are much closer than 25 miles away, and
3We also performed the analysis dividing counties into four and five groups. Alternate groupings
did not significantly affect the qualitative results of the analysis.
4These are the results when the national sample is used instead of the regional analysis. These
values are not used in the subsequent analysis and are only meant to illustrate the effects.
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any referrals from neighboring rural areas would probably be spread out among the
many hospitals in an urban area.
There are many ways to assess the performance of this stage. One is to compare
the predicted market types to the actual. Figure B.6 maps the predicted market type
(when using three market types) to the actual market type. The predicted market
type is determined by taking a weighted average of the three groups (
∑J
i=1 i·P(j = i)).
Though the predictions don’t conform exactly to the actual type, the groupings do
seem distinct and trend in the correct direction. The predicted market types when
compared to the actual market types passed the Kendall correlation test.
Next, one can asses the predicted market type’s quality as an instrumental vari-
able. In both of the first stage regressions,5 the coefficients of the instruments are all
non-zero satisfying the rank condition. Additionally, the first stage passes the weak
identification test with an F-statistic of 37.650.
2.5.2 Frontier Analysis
Table A.5 summarizes the coefficients of the cost function estimation. The left
column (raw results) contains the coefficients when the population group dummies
are used directly. The right column (treated results) is the estimation using the
likelihoods from the multinomial logit. In all cases, the coefficients have the same
sign and statistical significance. Additionally, the magnitudes are very similar in
almost all cases. There were only 5316 hospitals subjected to the frontier analysis.
Fifty-four of the hospitals did not include an ownership type and had to be dropped,
while the remainder did not include information used in the multinomial logit stage.
Because these hospitals had no predicted county-type, they weren’t included in this
portion of the analysis.
5One for each market size other than the reference group which in this case is small markets.
21
First, notice how the coefficients in the two sets of results are very similar in
most cases. This suggests that the selection bias doesn’t have significant effects on
these parameters of the cost function. The largest difference in magnitudes is in the
teaching hospital dummy; the reason is the correlation between the teaching dummy
and the location choice. Most teaching hospitals operate in urban areas; because
urban areas are lower cost, the raw results suggest that teaching hospitals are lower
cost. However, the treated results control for that effect. Therefore, though the
raw results indicate that teaching hospitals are more costly than non-teaching, they
slightly diminish the true effect.
It’s difficult to interpret the coefficients of the outputs and input prices because
of the structure of the cost function. To address this problem, Table A.6 presents
the cost elasticities of the two output variables and the price of capital. It includes
the elasticities calculated at the mean as well as the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles.
As expected, all elasticities are positive. At the mean, admissions and outpatients
increase costs more than the price of capital.
However, the positive coefficient on the CMI variable matches our expectations
that more severe patients require more resources to treat. Also, it’s interesting to
see that whether a hospital belongs to a system doesn’t significantly affect the costs.
This runs counter to the purported rationale for increasing hospital concentration.
Table A.7 shows the coefficients of the efficiency variables. It is again divided into
two columns corresponding to the untreated (left) and treated (right) results.6 As
expected the treated results do depart from the raw results, especially with regards
to ownership and location.
If we focus first on the demographic controls, we again see that controlling for
6Coefficients in Table A.7 describe how the variable shifts the distribution of the efficiency-
explained error term. Higher values denote a positive marginal effect on inefficiency and a negative
effect on efficiency.
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the selection bias doesn’t affect most of the parameter estimates. Though in both
specifications, higher concentration reduces efficiency, the effect is smaller in the
treated results. This, like teaching can be explained by the correlation of HHI with
market size. In larger markets, the HHI will likely be smaller than in small markets
because there are more firms competing in the former. In many small markets, there’s
only a single hospital (which leads to an HHI of 1). Because the raw data suggest
that larger markets are more efficient than smaller markets, one would expect the raw
estimation to generate a positive coefficient. However, with the location correction,
market concentration has a smaller effect on inefficiency.
Also, the demographic controls suggest a correlation between health and effi-
ciency; the healthier the people, the less efficient the hospitals.7 This is possibly
caused by some type of returns to scale. Less healthy people need to use the hospital
more; perhaps the hospitals improve with the experience or have higher utilization
rates.
Table A.7 also provides the variables of interest for this paper. All coefficients
are relative to the base outcome–non-profit hospitals in the smallest market. Table
A.8 restructures the data into the marginal inefficiency (relative to non-profits). It
is included to ease interpretation.
The population dummies, because they’re statistically insignificant (in the raw
results), suggest that non-profits operate with similar levels of efficiency across all
markets. The treated results, however, instead of uniform efficiency, suggest more
volatility; in the large markets, non-profits now have a significantly lower level of
inefficiency. These results could be a by-product of the competition between so
many hospitals in those areas. Indeed, we will see that all three ownership types
7We take for granted that health status is correlated with aﬄuence and that aﬄuence is corre-
lated with race.
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perform better in absolute terms in the largest markets.
Multiplying the coefficients for the interaction terms by the likelihood that a
particular ownership type will be in that market will yield the inefficiency of each
market. We would expect that larger markets have higher inherent efficiency in the
raw results, but these results don’t match those expectations. When calculated,
size of market has a positive though insignificant effect on inefficiency. It could be
possible, however, that the controls erase any effect. When run with only population
group as an ordinal variable, we find that there is a small (-0.00245), statistically
significant effect. If we add for-profit and public dummies, the effect, though still
negative is no longer significant.
Comparing across ownership types, the raw results here match previous studies
that show that for-profits are more efficient than both non-profit and public hospitals
and public hospitals are more efficient than non-profits; the ordering holds for all
market sizes. These results can be seen more easily by comparing the dashed lines in
Figure B.7. The lines indicate marginal (compared to non-profit) inefficiency. The
dashed lines represent the raw results, and the lower dashed line is for-profit while
the higher dashed line is public hospitals. In each market type, for-profits are the
most efficient, and public come between the for-profit line and the x-axis. For-profits
operating at the lowest cost conforms to expectations for a traditional industry.
Public hospital efficiency relative to non-profit is both unexpected and difficult to
explain. We do not know of anyone who attempts to account for differences in
management or performance between non-profit and public-run enterprises.
The treated results (the right column of Table A.7, the right three columns of
Table A.8, and the solid lines of Figure B.7) tell a more complicated story. Even after
correcting for the location choice, the same general relationships endure: for-profits
are more efficient than public and public are more efficient than non-profit. These
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results span small and medium-sized markets, but in the large markets, the point
estimates indicate that for-profits are less efficient than public hospitals (although
the difference is not statistically significant).
The main conclusion to draw from this is that hospitals do consider the markets’
attributes when deciding where to operate and the location is, therefore, endogenous.
Estimations that don’t consider this endogeneity will have biased results. When the
coefficients of interest are subjected to the Hausman specification test, the values are
significantly different with an H-statistic of 186.6.
Figures B.8 and B.9 plot the estimated inefficiency for each individual hospital
and groups them by ownership type and location. In figure B.8, we can see that for
non-profit and public hospitals, efficiency increases as population density increases;
for for-profit hospitals, it’s noticeable only in the large markets. The second striking
fact is that for-profit hospitals are uniformly more efficient than the others in all
markets. Only public hospitals in the large markets have comparable efficiency levels.
Figure B.9 shows how inefficiency levels change after correcting for the self-
selection bias. In the small markets, only for-profit hospitals’ efficiency improves,
while non-profit and public hospitals’ increase. In medium markets, it is the non-
profit efficiency that improves, albeit not drastically, and in the large markets, all
ownership types show significant declines in inefficiency. This suggests that the bias
has the largest influence on estimates of efficiency in the large markets.
No prior research has explored how the relationships among ownership types
might depend on the market conditions. There are two differences between the raw
and treated results. In the small markets, for-profit hospitals operate much more
efficiently than the raw results indicate.8 In the large markets, public hospitals
8These results are not driven by a few hospitals. The distributions of all the for-profit hospitals
and public hospitals in small markets are plotted in Figure B.10.
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operate more efficiently than for-profit hospitals (statistically no different). The
latter fact could be explained by the heavy competition in large markets having
larger impacts on public hospitals than any other type. It’s conceivable that the
profit motive is a strong enough incentive for for-profit hospitals in any setting, but
without that motive, only competition can effect similar results.
This is an extension of Caves and Christensen (1980)’s conclusion that when
public enterprises face competitive pressure they perform as efficiently as for-profit
firms. We see that when public hospitals are in a competitive environment, point
estimates show them to be the most efficient, but in less dense areas, for-profit
hospitals clearly outperform the others.
This conclusion suggests that governments planning to build hospitals to pro-
vide health services to their un-served or under-served populations should consider
subsidizing for-profit hospitals instead of managing their own. This approach could
provide the desired access to care at a lower cost. Public hospitals already operating
might consider either privatizing or subcontracting certain services. In urban ar-
eas, these results suggest no new policies, as competition seems to at least partially
substitute for ideal policy.
What’s counter-intuitive is that neither public hospitals nor for-profit hospitals
locate in the areas where they have a comparative advantage minimizing costs. Public
hospitals locate in rural areas though they perform best in urban while for-profit
hospitals show the reverse behavior. This could be explained by the fact that the
estimates are relative to other hospitals in the same area. It could still be true that




This is the first paper that attempts to account for the differing motivations
of health service providers. Its primary contribution is to point out that different
hospital types’ different objectives not only influence how they operate but also which
markets they serve since they have both the ability and the desire to control which
patients they serve.
We find that although raw data suggest that for-profits are more efficient in
all markets than the competing ownership types, once location choice is addressed,
public hospitals’ performance compares favorably with that of for-profits in larger
markets. This reinforces the notion that competition can provide a powerful impetus
for firms to reduce their costs even without a profit motive.
One criticism of this work is the choice to use stochastic frontier analysis to
determine efficiency. While this might be appropriate for for-profit firms, it’s not
clear that the other ownership types necessarily are trying to minimize their costs.
It’s conceivable that both non-profits adhere to a utility maximization motivation
wherein they try to find an optimal combination of quality and quantity. However,
this paper purports to measure the cost-effectiveness of hospitals, if non-profits are
choosing not to minimize their costs, it wouldn’t affect the results obtained, it would
only offer a explanation as to why they perform worse than the other two types.
Despite this legitimate criticism, the results here are important to consider. The
hospital industry stands alone as a market containing significant proportions of three
ownership types competing with each other. It offers a unique setting in which to test
widely held assumptions about for-profit motives and results. Why is their success
confined to larger markets? Do the problems inherent with for-profit firms in an
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industry characterized by information asymmetry that have been discussed pertain
only to small markets? The answers to these questions can push policy-makers to
adjust laws to motivate certain types of hospitals in certain settings.
28
3. INCENTIVIZING OWNERSHIP: CAN GOVERNMENT AFFECT FIRM
COMPOSITION
3.1 Introduction
Many economists have argued that certain industries (such as healthcare) have
fundamental idiosyncrasies that prevent for-profit firms from enhancing social welfare
as they do in “normal” industries. Foremost among these industries is healthcare.
In these environments, it may be optimal to impel non-profit enterprises and impede
the for-profit. In this paper I determine whether the US government has the ability
to shape the composition of competitors in the private Medicare market. I find that
by adjusting the payment formula, it can control that particular outcome.
Another contested issue is whether non-profit firms act in the interest of society
at large or for non-altruistic and selfish motives. Admittedly, the answer likely
varies from industry to industry and firm to firm as to the degree of altruism, but
Medicare Advantage could provide us a context in which we can find some evidence.
If non-profit firms are acting in the interests of society, then high profit-margin
environments, on average, should not attract their participation. It might be the
case that they pursue high profits in order to cross-subsidize less aﬄuent areas, but
on average, those two effects should cancel each other out to some extent.
However, if profit margins have a greater effect on non-profit participation than
for-profit participation, then this suggests that non-profits are not behaving as mag-
nanimously as governments desire. Additionally, the preferential tax treatment could
explain small differences in effects between the two enterprises.
I do this by using a model of firm entry devised in Berry (1992) that includes the
ability to treat individual firm characteristics as explanatory variables. In this case I
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used both the non-profit status of the firms and its interaction with the government
capitation payments to the plans. If the interaction term is not zero, the result
implies that non-profit firms respond differently to the payment schedule, and the
government can to some extent control the composition of the firms. The magnitude
of the deviation from zero will represent how sensitive the composition will be.
I apply this model to publicly available datasets: the Area Resource File, the
Medicare Advantage Enrollment data, and the Medicare Advantage Plan Directory.
The latter two are available from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
though historic plan directories are no longer present. The Enrollment data pro-
vides enrollment numbers by county and plan, while the directory lists organization
information for each plan. The Area Resource File is provided by the Department
of Health and Human Services. It contains detailed demographic and health-care
related data for each county.
This paper is the first to apply the Berry (1992) framework to health insurance
and the first to explore how non-profit insurers in Medicare might respond differently
to the capitation payments. While many studies have examined how non-profits
might effect different outcomes than for-profits, few have analyzed what factors might
affect the composition of firms. It is also the first to use firm-level analysis instead of
the plan-level analysis featured in previous papers. This lends additional credence to
the analysis of the Medicare Advantage market which has been studied previously.
Few studies are concerned with either the factors that explain the presence of non-
profit firms or the effects that non-profit firms have on an industry. With respect to
the latter, a few studies have concentrated on the insurance industry in particular.
Dafny and Ramanarayanan (2012) found that when a non-profit insurer that domi-
nates a market converts to a for-profit insurer, premiums for employer plans increase
substantially. These results suggest that policy-makers may be interested in trying
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to push markets one way or another.
The cost of Medicare has recently been a hotly debated issue, and, specifically,
the payments made to private plans under Medicare have been criticized for being
too high. Previous administrations have increased capitation payments to attract
entrants and create a market with multiple competitors in each county so that seniors
across the country will have several choices. Research into the topic has supported
that argument. Opponents, however, argue that the objective of the private plans
was to reduce the costs of Medicare, but paying them such high prices counteracts
any savings. If non-profit firms offer superior quality and/or lower prices and if
lower payment rates can tilt the industry toward them, then a less costly, higher
value product would result.
Several states have laws that favor formation of non-profit enterprises. One in-
direct example would be levying high corporate tax rates. In these environments,
non-profit firms would operate at a relative advantage. This advantage for non-
profits would allow them to, conceivably, charge lower prices to consumers or offer a
higher quality of service, or both. If for-profits are truly unable to increase welfare
in certain industries, then governments should do what they can to accommodate
alternative organization types. Doing so could reduce the competitive burden that
may prevent non-profits from entering the industry.
3.2 Literature
Exploring the determinants of entry decisions has long been of interest to Indus-
trial Organization. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) developed an econometric model of
entry that did not employ price or cost margin information. Instead, it relied only
on observed entry in markets and the size (and other demographic information) of
the markets. Their basic premise was that larger populations should be able to sup-
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port increasing numbers of firms and that those thresholds can be estimated. Their
model hinges on the assumption that additional firms will reduce market prices, and,
therefore, profit margins until the next potential firm would earn negative profits.
Berry (1992) improved on the Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) framework by allowing
for firm heterogeneity. Adding this complication, however, required that he account
for multiple equilibria based on which firm types decided to enter; it could be possible
that different orders of entry may result in different numbers of equilibrium firms.
By restricting the firms’ characteristics to affect only their own fixed costs, Berry
shows that there can be only one equilibrium number of firms, though the identities
of the firms within that equilibrium could fluctuate.
Mazzeo (2002), Seim (2006), and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) each offered alter-
native approaches to the previous two models. Mazzeo (2002) replaced firm hetero-
geneity in fixed costs with the ability for the firms to product differentiate. He found
that the quality of a firm’s competitors does change their effect on profits. Seim
(2006) offers a related model of entry wherein instead of firms choosing different
quality types, they choose physical locations within markets. Her results support
the Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) approach when the product is homogeneous.
Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) broadened the Berry framework to obviate order
of entry assumptions. Their model also estimated other-firm effects on profits. It
provides more versatility than Berry (1992) because it allows, for example, Southwest
to have a different effect on American’s profits than United has and vice versa. They
accomplished this by accounting for the uniqueness of equilibria in their simulation.
By doing so they were able to estimate a lower bound and upper bound of probability
for each possible outcome. As such, they only partially identify the parameters.
Each of these methods has its advantages. In this paper I will focus mainly on
the Berry (1992) methodology, but I’ll also compare its results against the results
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obtained from both the Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)
frameworks.
Several health economists have been interested in the Medicare Advantage Pro-
gram, and, in particular, the decision of firms to enter markets. Both Town and Liu
(2003) and Maruyama (2011) used structural models to study the industry. Their
main objective was to determine the welfare impacts of the program.
Cawley, Chernew and McLaughlin (2005) applies the Bresnahan and Reiss (1991)
framework to estimate how government Medicare Advantage payments affect the
number of providers in a market. They predicted (and found) that higher payments
would increase the profits of the plans, and, thereby, increase the number of plans
available. The Medicare Advantage market is an especially appropriate market for
this type of analysis because of the well-defined market areas and the availability of
data for both the markets and the plans.
Only Maruyama (2011) accounted for the different ownership status of some
firms. By including non-profit status as a dummy affecting fixed costs in the firm
profit equation, he found that non-profits faced lower fixed costs than for profit
firms. He explained this by appealing to the non-profits choosing markets with less
consideration of profitability, and that these markets have lower fixed costs associated
with them.
In addition to including the ownership status of the hospital as Maruyama (2011)
and Town and Liu (2003) did, my paper will also include several types of insurance
plans–HMO, PPO, etc. Additionally, instead of treating each plan as a potential
entrant, it aggregates plans owned by a single firm and treats that as one entrant.
Finally, the core contribution is the inclusion of an interaction between non-profit
status and capitation payment rate to determine how payments influence the own-
ership composition of firms.
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3.3 Industry Background
When Medicare was created in 1965, it comprised only two parts: Part A which
mostly covered hospital costs and Part B which mostly covered outpatient proce-
dures. In 1985, Medicare Advantage began to take form. Part C of Medicare was
intended to expand the choices available for seniors on Medicare. Instead of being
confined to the publicly run program, seniors could choose to enroll in HMOs au-
thorized by the government to serve the Medicare population. The private plans
would be required to cover the same benefits as Medicare Part A, but could struc-
ture its payment system any way it desired. Beneficiaries would still be required to
participate in Part B and pay the additional premium.1
If a beneficiary chose to enroll in one of the private plans, Medicare would pay the
plan annually 95% of the average cost for the beneficiaries living in the same county.
Between 1985 and 2009, the program changed names first to Medicare+Choice then
to Medicare Advantage. Congress also changed the formula to determine how much
the plans would be paid for the beneficiaries who enroll with them. They added risk-
adjustment factors (gender, age, and medical history) to the baseline payment, but
they also modified how the baseline was determined. Instead of using 95% of the Fee
for Service (FFS) rate as they did before, the baseline would be the the maximum of
the FFS rate adjusted for inflation or a minimum rate based on geography. Congress
expected and intended that these increased rates would persuade more private plans
to participate.
Insurance companies that participate Medicare Advantage create insurance plans
to offer to seniors and request approval from the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) to offer those plans in counties. Once approved, the insurance com-
1For a more detailed history of the Medicare Advantage program, McGuire, Newhouse and
Sinaiko (2011) is an invaluable resource.
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pany can offer those plans to the citizens of the counties the plans are approved for.
Seniors can go online, enter their ZIP code and see a list of plans that are offered
to them. Insurance companies may choose to offer different plans within the same
county (perhaps different cost structures; some may charge premiums some may not),
and they may choose to offer their plan only in certain ZIP codes, although only 10%
of plan-counties choose to do so. Additionally, less than 3% of plan-counties offer
their plan in less than 50% of the county’s ZIP codes.
In September 2011, 11.9 million (25%) of Medicare’s beneficiaries were enrolled
in a Medicare Advantage Plan, and that figure fluctuates from state to state and
county to county. Insurance plans can be split into both ownership types (for-profit
and non-profit) and insurance plan types (HMO, PPO, etc.). Most providers are
for-profit providers, and they are much more prevalent in urban areas.
3.4 Data
One advantage of studying Medicare Advantage is that CMS provides abundant
data and provide convenient market definitions–counties. For this study, these county
data will come from the Area Resource File (ARF) provided by the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services Health Resources and Service Administration.
The Area Resource File dataset is an unbalanced time series where some data are
available for only certain years. To best combine the two datasets this study focuses
on July 2007. I treat all plan types (HMO, PPO, etc.) as identical for now. Though
they likely have both different variable cost structures and fixed costs, my empirical
model will focus on the difference in fixed costs. I consider ownership and ownership
interacted with the Part C payment as the heterogeneous variables.
While the ARF provides the demographic and general health data for the coun-
ties, the insurance plan data come from CMS; they provide a list of contracts (an
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authorization for an insurance company to serve a particular county), the number of
beneficiaries who enrolled under that contract in that county, and other information
about the contract such as ownership and service type (HMO, PPO, etc.). Contracts
may comprise more than one configuration or “plan” (such as copayment rates or
premiums) for the enrollees. Enrollment data are not provided at the plan-level.
Two problems with the enrollment data must be addressed–the presence of firms
that have contracted to serve a county but show no enrollment and firms that have
enrollees but no contract. The former problem could be caused by firms opening
contracts broadly even though they have no immediate plans to compete in those
counties but may in the future. Additionally, they could be firms that were once
active in the county but have decided to avoid the market indefinitely. I treat these
observations as if the company was not operating in that county; even though it has
an open contract, the focus of this study is on firms that are actively competing in
a market.
Cross-county health care seekers and member migration are primarily responsible
for the reverse problem. Because the data are reported by beneficiary address, it may
appear as if a plan is active in a market even though it’s not legally able to compete.
Because these plans may not necessarily be offered in the new county, I use 0.5%
as the cutoff point denoting whether a firm is actively participating in a market; all
contracts with less market share are excluded from the analysis.
Of the two problems, the former is much more significant. When the combined
enrollment/service area data, there are 209,854 records representing firms either
operating in or being contracted to operate in a separate county. Of those, 191,461
(91%) show no enrollees; and 823 (¡1%) have enrollees but no contract. In addition,
1,909 (1%) of observations have market share less than 0.5% and are excluded.
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3.4.1 Firm Definition
Previous analyses have used plan-level data for their research. The problem with
doing so is that a single firm may operate multiple plans in a single market. They
may offer plans that attract different types of beneficiaries by offering HMOs to the
price-conscious, for example. If I treated each plan as an entrant, and firms choose
to provide a menu of options to beneficiaries when they enter a market, the results
would be biased because each plan may not be entering in order to maximize profit
for that plan, but instead, the firm is trying to maximize its profits as an entity.
In 2007, there were 240 parent organizations running plans in the Medicare Ad-
vantage program. Among the parent organizations, there were 385 subsidiaries oper-
ating a total of 583 plans across the country. 187 (78%) of the parent organizations,
operated only a single subsidiary; 26 operated two. Wellpoint, Humana, and United
Healthcare each operated more than ten.
The presence of multiple levels of management (plans, subsidiaries, and parent
companies) leaves the choice of ultimate decision-maker ambiguous. Do subsidiaries
consult with their sibling subsidiaries when deciding where to offer their plans or
at least, consider the corporate ownership of plans that are already present in tar-
get markets or do they act completely independently? To answer this question, I
compared the coverage overlap among subsidiaries of parent organizations to their
overlap with other corporations. More specifically, I determined the number of mar-
kets where two subsidiaries under the same parent competed and compared it to
the number of markets where two subsidiaries under different parents competed. If
the numbers were similar, that would suggest that the subsidiaries ignored corpo-
rate relationship; if the numbers were different, then that would indicate corporate
relationship mattered.
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Table A.12 shows the results of this analysis. Ratios near one signify subsidiary
independence while those diverging from one signify the opposite. High ratios and low
ratios represent different relationships: high ratios suggest that subsidiaries operate
in the same markets as each other while low ratios suggest that the subsidiaries
avoid each other. Notice how there are many more high-ratio parents than low-ratio
parents, and that the largest parents have ratios close to one. This implies that the
largest parents are operating differently from small parents.
One explanation for this is that the small parents’ subsidiaries are artifacts of
the design of the Medicare Advantage program, and they are operating separate
subsidiaries that each focus on one type of plan. For example, a small parent might
have one subsidiary dedicated to its HMO option and one dedicated to its PPO. In
fact, the data bear out that hypothesis for plans with extremely high ratios. Al-
ternatively, large parents are nationally competitive and operate several subsidiaries
just to increase their market coverage.
Of the subsidiaries, 325 (84%) operated only a single plan while one of the sub-
sidiaries (operating under United Health Care) operated 39 plans. The plan distri-
bution according to parent company is similarly skewed. Of the 240 parent organi-
zations, 160 (67%) operated only a single plan, while 90% operated three plans or
fewer. One parent (again, United Health Care) operated 85 plans.
To account for the different corporate structures, I used the plan’s headquarter
ZIP code as the decisive information. If the plan’s headquarters was the same as
the parent’s headquarters, I concluded that the parent company was the primary
decisionmaker. If two plans had the same parent and different subsidiaries, and
the plans’ headquarters were located in different ZIP codes, I treated the subsidiary
company as the main decision-maker. To avoid complicated nomenclature, I will
refer to the decision-maker entity as the firm for the remainder of the paper.
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After this aggregation, there were 313 firms operating which suggests that there’s
a mix of both types of parents. Also, no aggregated firm operated more than one
subsidiary within any market. On average, each firm operated in 45 markets (median
8) with a minimum of only one market (3 firms) and one firm operating in almost
2500 markets.
3.4.2 Potential Entrants
Berry’s estimation framework requires multiple potential market entrants to de-
fine the profitability threshold. This necessitates an algorithm to identify firms that
were likely to enter a potential market but chose not to. Maruyama (2011) discusses
several options for building this set. Because of the cross-sectional nature of my
data, previous entry could not be used. Instead, the pool of potential entrants in-
cluded actual entrants within that county, actual entrants in neighboring counties,
and firms with the highest share of state enrollees (the top three for-profit firms and
the top two non-profit firms). I differentiate by ownership type to ensure that both
ownership types are possible entrants.
Maruyama includes all plans that operate in the MSA or state; I excluded both.
Because I’m including firms operating in neighboring counties, that should account
for most of the firms within the same MSA. Additionally, firms are unlikely to enter
a market far from their current coverage area just because they are in the same state.
Table A.10 provides information on the number of firms both active in each market,
and added as potential entrants. It also breaks those firms down by their ownership
status.
On average, there are 4.5 firms active in each market, with a minimum of 0 and
a maximum of 15. The majority of active firms are for-profit firms. The pool of
potential entrants (including those already active) averages 10.6 firms/market. A
39
larger percentage of the non-active firms are non-profit than is the case for firms
actually operating. This is likely due to including the top two non-profit firms in
the state as potential entrants in each market. I have also listed the non-active firms
by criterion used; the adjacent market criterion clearly makes up the majority of
non-active firms. The sum of the two types of non-active firms exceeds the total for
all non-active plans, because some firms satisfy both criteria.
Figure B.11 shows the distribution of both active and non-active plans. The
distribution of both types is skewed toward zero. Figures B.12 and B.13 show the
number of active and non-active firms in each county, respectively. B.14 shows the
percentage of the county’s firms that are non-profit. Some states are more varied
than others (Colorado, Idaho) while others are uniformly different (Minnesota and
Tennessee). This indicates that there may be state-level policies that advantage non-
profit firms. I will control for the uniformly different states with dummy variables.
3.4.3 Payments
Figure B.15 shows the relationship between base capitation payments to plans
and how many firms compete in that market. Not only is the relationship positive,
but it is also very strong as the number of competitors rises very quickly with the base
payment. Increasing the payment from $700 to $800, for example, raises the number
of competing firms from two to thirteen. However, the strength of the relationship
diminishes with higher payments. As the figure shows, with higher payments, the
number of additional firms does not increase as rapidly.
Figure B.16 shows the relationship between base capitation payment and the
composition of firms in the market (percentage of firms that are non-profit). There
is a slight, but noticeable, trend showing that higher payments attract relatively
more for-profit firms. This suggests that for-profit firms are more responsive to
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the mechanism suggested in previous research (and by policy-makers) that higher
payment rates attract more firms.
3.4.4 Moments
Berry’s framework requires both firm-level and market-level moment conditions.
For the firm-level moment conditions, I interact the firm-level error (the difference
between the probability of entry and actual entry) with all market variables and firm
variables as well as state market share, area market share, and HHI calculated from
the market shares. For the market-level moment conditions, I interact the market-
level error (the difference between the predicted and actual number of firms) with
all market variables, the number of firms operating in area, size of market in relation
to size of area, and HHI. Because there’s a varying number of potential entrants for
each market, I use the moment conditions of the three firms with the highest market
share in the area.
3.5 The Model
I use Berry’s profit specification. In market i, firm k’s profits can be described as
Πmj = Ymλ+ Zmα + δ ln(j) + ρum +Wmjβ + σumj (3.1)
In this equation, Ym represents market-level demographic characteristics to reflect
demand and Zm includes market-level cost characteristics. j denotes the number of
insurers operating in the market and accounts for the competitive effect. um is
a market-level error term meant to capture unknown market-level shocks such as
density of hospitals. Wmj includes firm-level characteristics, and umj is a firm-level
error term.
um and umj are distributed i.i.d. standard normal across firms and markets. This
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suggests that a shock to a firm in one market won’t affect its operations in another.
While probably true for small shocks, there are certainly cases where a firm’s success
in one market will affect how it runs in others. For example an insurer in Chicago
might face an unexpected demand for services and direct resources away from other
areas. It also precludes a shock to a single firm affecting other firms in the market,
for example, if an insurer’s main provider was forced to shut down would increase
demand for the other insurers. Also, I impose σ =
√
1 − ρ2 to ensure the variance
of ik = uio + uik equals one.
3.6 Estimation Procedure
Following Berry (1992), I use a simulation estimator to determine the coefficients
β, ρ, α, δ, and σ. The simulation procedure begins by drawing M+K random values
from a standard normal distribution. Each market has a single disturbance value
as well as each firm in each of those markets. To begin the simulation, I guess
a coefficient vector to use. I determine Zikα and order the results by decreasing
profitability for each market. By market, the number of firms with higher values will
be N. I can then calculate the remainder of Equation 3.1.
The number of firms with profits greater than zero then will be the predicted
number of firms for that market. I repeat the procedure R times and average the
results for the frequency estimator. The error can be found by subtracting this value
from the observed number of firms operating in the market. In addition to this
market-specific error, I calculate firm-specific error by a similar procedure. For the F
firms with the highest market share in the neighboring markets, I determine whether
or not their estimated profit is greater than zero R times and take the average. I
subtract the average from one if it did enter and zero if it did not. The product
of these errors and a set of instruments is minimized by changing the parameter
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vector. In subsequent steps I weight the criterion function by the covariance matrix
calculated from previous estimations.
3.7 Results
The estimated coefficients are presented in Table A.13. The absolute magnitudes
of the coefficients have no real-world meaning, but the signs and relative magni-
tudes are relevant. The signs indicate whether that particular variable increased the
probability that additional firms would enter.
For the payment amount, this suggests that the higher the payment, the more
firms enter the insurance market; this reinforces previous research on the topic. It
also coincides with the relationship we see in Figure B.15. Notice also, that the
magnitude of the effect is the largest of all the coefficients, but keep in mind that
this is the effect of increasing the capitation payment by $1,000.
The coefficient for the interaction of payment and non-profit status is also positive
suggesting that non-profit firms are more sensitive to increases in the capitation
payment than the for-profit firms. One explanation is that non-profit insurers are
more likely to be the marginal firms. For-profit firms probably enter the lower-paying
counties and take advantage of the cream-skimming potential while non-profits are
less adept at doing so, so they can only compete in counties with higher payments.
This relationship is contrary to what we see in Figure B.16 because Figure B.16 does
not control for costs.
The capitation payments can also be considered as a proxy for profits. In essence,
the capitation payments represent revenues while the reimbursement levels represent
the cost for the plan to serve the average person in the county. Because I’m control-
ling for the latter (as well as demand and competitors), any change in the former
should represent a change in profits.
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The fact that this coefficient is positive means not only that non-profits are more
responsive to the level of potential profit in a market than are the for-profit firms, but
also must mean that they are attracted by the higher margins. This suggests that
these non-profits are in fact behaving as for-profits. They enjoy the added benefit,
however, of lower tax levels. With lower levels of taxation, the non-profit firms retain
a larger percentage of any profits they accrue, which might account for the additional
responsiveness.
Though the effect is statistically significant and positive, the economic significance
is rather small. The coefficient is less than 1% of the magnitude of that of the
capitation payment, suggesting that though positive, the effect is not remarkable.
However, if the only advantage non-profits have over for-profits is a lower tax liability,
the size of the effect wouldn’t be surprising.
The coefficient for the number of competitors is also negative. This reflects the
fact that the more firms already active in a market, the less profitable a new entrant
will be, and, therefore, the less likely a firm will enter the market. This estimate
conforms to expectations.
As for the remaining parameters, the more people who are using Medicare, the
more profits firms can earn which induces firms to participate in the market. This,
of course, represents the demand side of the market and matches previous results.
Conversely, the expectation of growth (percentage growth in enrollment) actually
suppresses entry which contradicts previous results.
Increased reimbursements imply that health costs are higher in those markets,
which not surprisingly decreases the likelihood that insurers would want to partici-
pate in that market, especially given the fact that they must charge each patient the
same premium. Income and % white collar both decrease insurer participation.
Finally, distance from headquarters decreases a firm’s likelihood of entering a
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market; this fact supports the idea that most firms participating in this market do
so at a local level, and the costs of negotiating contracts in remote locations outweigh
the potential increases in revenues.
Figures B.17 and B.18 show the model’s predictions for the number of total
firms operating in each market and the number of for-profit firms in each market,
respectively. The line included is a 45 deg line. Though neither looks particularly
accurate, the market prediction seems to be better than the for-profit predictions.
The market predictions do seem to increase as the actual number of firms goes up,
but the trend is considerably flatter than a 1 to 1 correlation. In Figure B.18, there
seems to be little to no correlation.
3.8 Conclusion
Non-profit insurance companies play a significant role in the Medicare Advantage
program, but their intentions, whether altruistic or not, are not clear. Understanding
how they make entry decisions will help elucidate what drives their other decisions.
In this paper, I have found that they are more responsive to increases in the Medicare
Advantage capitation payments than are the for-profit firms competing in the same
industry. This suggests that their behavior is more akin to the profit motive than
the goal of providing health care services to more needy consumers.
If non-profits are not acting in the public interest, the preferential tax treat-
ment would no longer be necessary. Of course, this kind of change should not be
undertaken lightly. Non-profits in many industries (including Medicare Advantage)
provide an important service. There are many non-profit organizations who are ac-
tively attempting to promote and enhance public welfare, and they should continue
to be encouraged.
Additionally, this research provides the government with a mechanism to either
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promote or suppress non-profit participation in the Medicare Advantage market,
depending on their policy objectives. Higher payments increase the number of non-
profit plans relative to for-profit plans. Previous research has found that increased
payments also increase total number of competitors in a market; if non-profits do
in fact act in the public interest (either in contradiction to this research or after
future policy changes), then this research provides a mechanism to increase non-
profit participation in markets.
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4. THE WELFARE EFFECT OF MEDICARE ADVANTAGE: A MICRO
APPROACH
4.1 Introduction
Policymakers are increasingly exploiting market forces when designing systems
to achieve their political objectives. The most famous example is the creation of
the cap-and-trade system applied to sulfur dioxide emissions in the 1990 Clean Air
Act. Policymakers decided their approach should align firms’ incentives with public
welfare instead of dictating particular outcomes.
From school choice to automobile emissions, examples of legislators embedding
their goals within the constructs of economic insights abound. When done thought-
fully, they can reduce the adverse effects of regulations and enhance welfare.
This approach to public policy can manifest in several ways. One possibility
is to allow private firms to compete with publicly-run programs. Charter schools
and package delivery firms such as FedEx and UPS are examples of this method.
Another example is Medicare Advantage. In Medicare Advantage, private insurers
compete with each other and the government (in the form of Medicare) to offer
health insurance to people over 65. Advocates argue that the presence of competition
pressures the government to better serve the public by offering them options they
may prefer. If citizens prefer the public option, then this points to a market failure
for that particular industry (assuming the public option is competing on relatively
equal footing), while if citizens forgo the public option, this implies that it is poorly
run at worst or unnecessary at best.
Given an additional option, if someone prefers it, its existence has increased social
welfare since that one person is better off with it. However, if the cost of providing
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that option is greater than the increase in welfare, it is better not to offer it. This
conflict is at the heart of the debate over Medicare Advantage. In 2003, politicians
enamored with the power of competition (possibly overly-enamored) increased the
payment rates above those of traditional Medicare in an effort to increase private
competition in the program. In 2009, Medicare Advantage paid 14% more than
traditional Medicare per enrollee.
Opponents argue that the difference offsets the potential welfare from increased
choice and have passed laws to reduce the disparity. Thanks to the Medicare Im-
provements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008, that difference fell to 9% in 2010
and is expected to fall to only 2% by 2017 Biles et al. (2012). Supporters of the
Medicare Advantage program decry this reduction and argue that it will result in
the exodus of private firms and reduction of choices for seniors. These positive con-
sequences are not disputed by those who want to reduce costs, but the debate is over
the normative results.
This strain of research is important both to the current debate over the levels of
”reimbursements” to insurance companies participating in Medicare Advantage, but
also to insurers for the general population. Medicaid recipients also have the ability
to choose private plans to provide their insurance. With the expansion of Medicaid
being undertaken by many states under the Affordable Care Act as well as the likely
expansion of Medicare as the over-65 population swells in the next few decades, it
is important to determine an optimal level of competition in these markets and the
costs of reaching those levels.
More broadly, as the government and society evolve, it is likely that in some
industries, the public will want government to become more involved while in others,
they will desire the addition/expansion of private choices. Private firms competing
with the government with any level of success enhance social welfare and should be
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encouraged as long as the benefits outweigh the costs.
I find that for the year 2005, the Medicare Advantage program had a net cost to
the government of $11.11 billion but increased welfare by $18.87 billion. Therefore,
the net increase in welfare was $7.76 billion. This is evidence that the Medicare
Advantage program was an efficient use of tax-payer dollars despite paying, according
to my data, 28% more per beneficiary (this figure is higher than the figures above
because it also accounts for advantageous selection into Medicare Advantage).
4.2 Literature
Small and Rosen (1981) provided the framework used to estimate the welfare
generated by discrete choices. Their methodology has been applied to innumerable
situations. They proposed it in the context of estimating the welfare loss from
increased taxation, but it has been adapted to estimate the welfare effects of both
quality changes with choices and the loss (or gain) of choices themselves. This
approach is suited for the analysis of many decisions consumers make–automobiles,
homes, cereal, etc., any circumstance when they choose a discrete unit of a good
instead of the quantity of a particular good.
There have been several applications of this technique to estimate the consumer
welfare from Medicare Advantage in particular–most notably Town and Liu (2003)
and Maruyama (2011). Additionally, Hall (2010) and Dunn (2010) contributed to the
evidence with regard to this program. Though Maruyama and Town and Liu included
both demand and supply sides to their model, all four used a similar approach to
estimate the demand-side, and, hence, the change in welfare.
All four used the aggregated method developed by Berry (1994) to estimate con-
sumer choice and welfare. Using this approach, they were able to take advantage
of the enrollment data provided by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
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(CMS) to calculate market shares of each Medicare Advantage insurance plan in each
county and therefrom estimate a discrete choice model. They then used those esti-
mates to determine indirect utility and the change in utility from removing Medicare
Advantage.
Instead of using the aggregate enrollment data, I will use survey responses of
Medicare beneficiaries to estimate the effect of individual and plan characteristics on
their choice of whether to participate in Medigap, Medicare Advantage, or remain
with traditional Medicare. In previous literature, the authors treated Medicare with
supplemental Medigap as the outside option. This may bias their results against
Medicare Advantage as it assumes all beneficiaries not in Medicare Advantage par-
ticipate in the more comprehensive Medigap.
Maruyama, Hall, and Dunn all found the net benefit of Medicare Advantage (in-
creased welfare minus operational costs) to be close to $10B/year. Hall finds that
figure to be true from 1999-2002, Dunn in 2007, and Maruyama in 2003 and 2004.
All four authors included estimated profits from the private plans as well. The con-
sistency of these results despite the differences in methodology implies either their
accuracy or that their chosen method of estimating demand overwhelmed the less
significant estimation decisions in their approach. By estimating based on survey
responses instead of market shares, I provide evidence in favor of the former expla-
nation.
4.3 The Model
4.3.1 Insurance Plan Choice
Seniors (denoted i) choose their insurance plan (denoted j) based on many char-
acteristics: premium, copay, deductible, out of pocket spending maxima, the size
of the network, the fees for going out of network, and the customer service of the
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insurer. It will also depend on other patient characteristics such as income, gender,
etc.
uij = u(oopij, networkj, servicej, Xi) (4.1)
The out of pocket fees will be some function of the premium, copays, and de-
ductibles with the patient’s health as well as the network (the patient will have to
pay higher amounts if they go out of network).
oopij = oop(premiumij, copayij, deductibleij, healthi, oopmaxij, networkj) (4.2)
4.3.2 Program Choice
Seniors’ choice of which program to utilize is very similar to their choice of insur-
ance plan. They consider the same factors as previously.
uij = u(oopij, networkj, servicej, Xi) (4.3)
oopij = OOP (premiumij, copayij, deductibleij, healthi, oopmaxij, networkj) (4.4)
The equation I’ll estimate will be




i + ij (4.5)
which leaves network and service as components of the error term. Because both
would be correlated with the costs of insurance (probably distributed through premi-
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ums, deductibles, copays, etc.), endogeneity would exist. However, the endogeneity
would be constrained because of the aggregated nature of the decision. Because we
are only looking at whether they choose Medicare, Medigap, or Medicare Advan-
tage, correlation between variables would be limited. For example, the Medicare and
Medigap networks are largely the same, so that would not affect the patient’s choice
between the two.
4.3.3 Implementation
Actual estimation will employ a conditional logit model where the choice variable
is the program (traditional Medicare, Medigap, and Medicare Advantage). It takes
the form
uij = βxXi + betaZZij + ij
where Zij is a set of choice-specific variables, Xi is a set of beneficiary-specific vari-
ables, and ij has a generalized extreme value error distribution.
Zij comprises out of pocket (OOP) costs as well as a proxy for network size.
For those who have provided their OOP costs, those are entered directly into the
estimation; because respondents can only provide OOP costs for the program they
chose, other OOP costs must be imputed. For Medigap, the average OOP costs for
Plan F is used for those not participating. For traditional Medicare and Medicare
Advantage, estimates from Medicare.gov are used.
The network variable is calculated with a similar method, but exclusively from
the survey data. To proxy for the size of the network, I use the response to the
question: ”How many minutes does it usually take to get to Dr.’s office?” I then
calculate means for each program to fill in the missing observations.
Xi includes demographic variables such as age (age squared), gender, education,
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marriage status. It also includes dummy variables indicating whether the respondent
was currently employed and whether he was a veteran. Finally, it includes the
categorical response (on a scale 1-5) to the question ”How would you compare your
health to others the same age?”
4.3.4 Consumer Surplus
To estimate the consumer surplus from having an additional option in a discrete
choice model is a pretty straight-forward process. One need only calculate the change
in indirect utility and convert it to a monetary figure. In this case, the change in
indirect utility can be expressed as
















where the subscripts 0 and 1 represent the actual state (with Medicare Advantage)
versus the hypothetical state (without Medicare Advantage), respectively. This value
is then multiplied by the inverse of the marginal utility of income to obtain the
expected welfare (in dollar terms) added by Medicare Advantage. In this case, I will
use the coefficient for the out of pocket costs as the marginal utility of income. This
calculation is done on a per-person basis and will be weighted to represent the full
Medicare population.
4.3.5 Net Costs of Medicare Advantage
The net costs are calculated using CMS’s enrollment data. For each county, the
base capitation payment is multiplied by the number of seniors enrolled in a Medi-
care Advantage plan to obtain the base cost. For privacy reasons, CMS aggregates
counties with fewer than 11 seniors enrolled in Medicare in Medicare Advantage into
a single observation. For those beneficiaries, I use the average base payment for the
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state.
CMS reports enrollment information on a quarterly basis. To obtain the full
year’s estimate, for each county, values are interpolated for the months not reported,
and figures for all twelve months are combined.
To estimate the costs had all of the Medicare Advantage enrollees participated
in traditional Medicare instead, I take the per capita costs for traditional Medicare
enrollees for each county. To account for the different risk profiles of traditional
Medicare and Medicare Advantage, I use the risk scores reported by CMS for each
county and program (and the average risk score for the state for counties with fewer
than eleven enrollees). These risk scores are calculated for each Medicare beneficiary
based on the diagnoses he receives. Those scores are then averaged for the popu-
lations of both programs. The higher the score, the less healthy the beneficiary is,
generally. To correct for this differential, I multiply the base payment by the ratio
of the risk scores for each program in each county.
4.4 Data
4.4.1 Overview
The data used come from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS). The
MCBS is an annual survey of Medicare’s beneficiaries meant to understand the quan-
tity of their care, access to care, as well as how that care is delivered. It comprises
two modules–the Access to Care and Cost and Use. The former surveys the ben-
eficiaries’ interaction with the health care industry–specifically, insurers, hospitals,
and doctors. Contrarily, the latter focuses on particular episodes such as services
performed. This analysis will be confined to the Access to Care module.
Additionally, the data will be from 2005. 2005 was the last year before Medicare
Part D went into effect, which gave all beneficiaries a new entitlement to prescrip-
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tion drug services. Prior to 2006, prescription drugs were only covered by certain
Medigap and Medicare Advantage Plans; those in traditional Medicare sought their
medications independently.
The sample includes a total of 15,769 respondents (out of about 42 million total
beneficiaries). Table A.14 provides some summary statistics for all respondents as
well as by which branch of Medicare the respondent utilizes. The mean respondent
earns less than twenty thousand dollars/year and reports better than average health
(the health figure is a self-reported rating of health on a scale of 1-5). About 78.8%
of the respondents are white, which is higher than the nation at large. A little
under half the sample is married and over half are female. Less than a quarter are
veterans. Unexpectedly, less than 70% of the respondents finished high school, while
25% finished college.
About half of the respondents use Medigap, about a third traditional Medicare
and over ten percent Medicare Advantage, making it the least-used option among
the three. (By 2013, between 20 and 25% of beneficiaries belonged to a Medicare Ad-
vantage plan). Those who opted for non-traditional Medicare were older, wealthier,
and better educated than those remaining. They also reported worse health. Demo-
graphically, white seniors were more likely to eschew traditional Medicare. Veterans
and women also opted for Medigap/Medicare Advantage.
4.4.2 Medigap
Figure B.21 shows the prices for the different plans respondents pay. It includes
only respondents who purchase their plans directly, not through an employer, union,
or AARP. The mean price paid for a directly purchased Medigap plan is $1,778/yr
(the median is $1,659). In the sample, there are 11,814 senior/Medigap plan com-
binations representing 8,579 actual respondents, each with an average 1.377 plans.
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(Almost 75% of beneficiaries had only one plan, 20% have two, 5% have three, and
2 % have 4 or 5 as can be seen in Figure B.20).
As you can see from Figure B.19, Plan F is the most popular of the Medigap
plans. 42.8% of people with only a single plan had Plan F (and 44% of respondents
with at least one plan participate in Plan F).
Of the people who participate in only a single plan, 78% paid at least part of the
premium. On average, they paid $1,928/yr. Because this is higher than the figure
for those purchasing their plans directly, it is possible that those who were subsidized
by a third party opted for more generous plans and end up paying more (it’s also
possible that these beneficiaries had higher-paying jobs when employed concomitant
with more generous benefits packages).
4.4.3 Medicare Advantage
As with the traditional Medicare and Medigap, the MCBS Access to Care Mod-
ule survey also surveys beneficiaries as to their utilization of Medicare Advantage.
Additionally, however, to estimate the net costs of the Medicare Advantage program,
I take advantage of the CMS enrollment data with regards to Medicare Advantage
plans in 2005 as well as the estimates of risk scores and calculations they provide for
both Medicare Advantage and traditional Medicare.
With regards to the survey, about 12% indicated that they participated in Medi-
care Advantage in that they were enrolled in a Medicare HMO. Figure B.22 breaks
down the number of Medicare Advantage plans that were available to each benefi-
ciary (whether they participated or not). More than 75% of beneficiaries had the
option of participating in Medicare Advantage, and more than half ( 57%) had at
least two competing plans to choose from. Of those who did participate, 76% chose a
plan that included prescription drugs, which suggests that this is a powerful incentive
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for participation, especially in the years before Medicare Part D.
As to the price of Medicare Advantage, about 63% of plans did not charge an
additional premium. Of those that did, contrary to Medigap, 88% of respondents
paid for it directly. Figure B.23 lays out the distribution of prices for Medicare
Advantage plans used by the respondents. The highest premium was $5400, and the
minimum non-zero premium was $20. The (non-zero) mean was ($958) $353, and
the (non-zero) median was ($780) $0.
The CMS enrollment data provide another perspective to the Medicare Advan-
tage program. These data are on a county basis and provide the total enrollment in
the Medicare Advantage program for each county. They also include the base capi-
tation payment paid for each enrollee for that county. As a check on the take-up of
Medicare Advantage, Figure B.24 shows the penetration figure from December 2004
through December 2005. As you can see it’s gradually increasing from 12.7% at the
end of 2004 to 14.0%. These figures are a little higher than those suggested earlier
from the MCBS. This can be attributed to how I assigned respondents to a program.
If respondents indicated that they participated in both Medigap and Medicare Ad-
vantage, if they were in Medicare Advantage, for less than half the year, they were
assigned to Medigap instead. For the month of December, about 14% of respondents
indicated they participated in a Medicare Advantage plan, which matches the CMS
data.
To account for the reported selection of healthy individuals into Medicare Ad-
vantage, I use the risk scores provided by CMS for each county and each program to
correct for the costs. Figure B.25 shows the distribution of the ratio of Medicare Ad-
vantage risk to traditional Medicare risk for each county in 2005 (ratios of less than
one suggest that Medicare Advantage enrollees are in better health than traditional
Medicare).
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The mean (weighted by the number of seniors eligible for Medicare) risk ratio is
0.945, suggesting a small but visible selection problem. Crenshaw County Alabama
has the lowest risk ratio (0.118) while Moore County, Texas has the highest (7.6605).
About 60% of counties exhibit positive selection into Medicare Advantage.
4.5 Results
Table A.15 provides the estimates for the coefficients. It is organized with the
choice-specific variables at the top, and the individiual-specific at the bottom. Tra-
ditional Medicare is the reference outcome. Surprisingly, the coefficient for the cost
variable is positive, indicating that higher cost plans increase utility. This is the
result of two factors: first, the method in which missing data were filled did not
include premium data for individuals in Medicare Advantage, only out of pocket es-
timates provided by CMS. This results in these estimates of OOP being sub-optimal.
Secondly, if beneficiaries have different tastes for risk, those tastes may skew our es-
timate of the coefficient for cost. The wait time for getting to a doctor decreases
utility. This is as expected.
As for the individual-specific terms, we can see that higher income beneficiaries
are more likely to opt for something other than traditional Medicare, with Medigap
being relatively more attractive. This fits with prior expectations of wealthier indi-
viduals choosing to and being more able pay for supplemental coverage. Additionally,
this suggests that more-educated beneficiaries are more likely to better understand
their options.
Older beneficiaries also opt for the supplemental coverage, especially Medicare
Advantage; this is possibly due to experience with the program. Older beneficiaries
are more likely to join Medicare Advantage than Medigap. Time limits for employer
subsidies could explain this.
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Married beneficiaries and veterans are more likely to choose either trans-traditional
Medicare program at statistically similar levels. Also, the employed are more likely
to stick with traditional Medicare. Their employer probably provides their own
health insurance coverage outside of Medicare which reduces the need for any kind
of supplement.
Another surprising outcome is that those in trans-traditional Medicare programs
report relatively worse health, with Medicare Advantage users reporting the lowest
level. This contradicts the risk ratio results discussed previously.
4.5.1 Net Costs of Medicare Advantage
With the results from the discrete choice model we can estimate the welfare
addition from the existence of the Medicare Advantage program, by first calculating
the figure for each individual, and then extrapolating those estimates to the entire
Medicare population.
Figure B.26 shows the distribution of respondents with regard to how much loss
in consumer surplus comes from removing Medicare Advantage as an option. The
mean loss is $597. The most any respondent stands to lose is $1,600 and the smallest
loss is about $1; the median is $660. Table A.16 shows the estimated welfare increase
both for the whole sample and broken down by program. Reassuringly, the highest
mean and median increases are for those enrolled in Medicare Advantage already.
When extrapolated to the entire Medicare population, the total welfare improvement
comes out to $18.87B in 2005.
From the CMS Medicare Advantage data, I estimate that Medicare Advantage
cost a total of $50.95 billion in 2005. Had those beneficiaries received their coverage
from traditional Medicare, it would have cost the government/Medicare $39.83B for a
net cost of $11.11B. Figure B.27 provides the distribution of net costs (in percentage
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terms relative to traditional Medicare) on a county basis. Comparing this figure to
the increased welfare, I conclude that in 2005, Medicare Advantage increased national




In 2011, Medicare explained 13.5% of the federal budget. As the baby-boomers
retire, even more money will be redistributed to seniors in the form of health care
benefits. Medicare Advantage is a program meant to offer seniors a choice of Medical
insurance tailored to their needs in an attempt to reduce costs and ensure quality in
traditional Medicare as well as for the numerous retirees who depend on it.
Recently, Medicare Advantage has been the subject of a conflict between the two
dominant parties, one of which believes the costs of providing extra options are too
high while the other concentrates on providing them with options. As is common in
policy debates, neither side provides the full cost-benefit picture.
This paper finds that the existence of Medicare Advantage, though more costly
than traditional Medicare, results in a net increase in consumer welfare. Whether
the level of payments is optimal, is left up to other researchers. Instead, this paper
supports previous research on the costs and benefits by using micro-level survey
data in lieu of enrollment figures to estimate the consumer surplus from Medicare
Advantage.
As the government expands in some sectors and retracts in others, the framework
of its intervention has significant implications for social welfare. By designing systems
in which the government is competing with private entities to provide services to
1The figure is high for MA enrollee because, really, everyone is benefiting from the additional
choice, but it’s being divided only among those who enroll.
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As my dissertation suggests, the complexity of the health care sector provides
an Economist with numerous targets to investigate. I have explored but three of
the myriad issues. In summary, I have found that free market principles benefit
consumers in the health care sector despite the potential market failures that could
exist. For-profit hospitals out-perform other types in the rural areas, but competition
compels the public hospitals to perform just as well; there is no welfare benefit
to non-profit insurance companies more than the advantages of having additional
competition; and the option of private insurance within Medicare provides citizens
important opportunities to tailor their insurance to their own needs.
Any segment of the economy that makes up as large a proportion as the health
care sector will, of course, include waste and inefficiencies–opportunities to improve
its functioning. Both the size and the complexity of health care in the United States
will provide future economists and policy-makers perpetual problems and opportu-
nities to provide solutions. Hopefully, this contribution aids that endeavor.
62
REFERENCES
Alchian, Armen A. 1965. “Some economics of property rights.” Il Politico, 30.
Battese, George E., and Sumiter S. Broca. 1997. “Functional Forms of Stochas-
tic Frontier Production Functions and Models for Technical Inefficiency Effects:
A Comparative Study for Wheat Farmers in Pakistan.” Journal of Productivity
Analysis, 8: 395–414.
Berry, Steven T. 1992. “Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry.”
Econometrica, 60(4): pp. 889–917.
Berry, Steven T. 1994. “Estimating Discrete-Choice Models of Product Differen-
tiation.” The RAND Journal of Economics, 25(2): pp. 242–262.
Biles, Brian, Giselle Casillas, Grace Arnold, and Stuart Guterman. 2012.
“The Impact of Health Reform on the Medicare Advantage Program: Realigning
Payment with Performance.” The Commonwealth Fund.
Bresnahan, Timothy F., and Peter C. Reiss. 1991. “Entry and Competition
in Concentrated Markets.” Journal of Political Economy, 99(5): pp. 977–1009.
Cameron, A. C., P. K. Trivedi, Frank Milne, and J. Piggott. 1988. “A
Microeconometric Model of the Demand for Health Care and Health Insurance in
Australia.” The Review of Economic Studies, 55(1): 85–106.
Cardon, James H., and Igal Hendel. 2001. “Asymmetric Information in Health
Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey.” The RAND
Journal of Economics, 32(3): 408–427.
63
Carey, Kathleen. 2003. “Hospital Cost Efficiency and System Membership.” In-
quiry, 40(1): 25–38.
Caves, Douglas W., and Laurits R. Christensen. 1980. Journal of Political
Economy, 88(5): pp. 958–976.
Cawley, John, Michael Chernew, and Catherine McLaughlin. 2005. “HMO
Participation in Medicare+Choice.” Journal of Economics & Management Strat-
egy, 14(3): 543–574.
Chirikos, Thomas N., and Alan M. Sear. 2000. “Measuring Hospital Efficiency:
A Comparison of Two Approaches.” Health Services Research, 34: 1389–1408.
Ciliberto, Federico, and Elie Tamer. 2009. “Market Structure and Multiple
Equilibria in Airline Markets.” Econometrica, 77(6): pp. 1791–1828.
Coelli, Tim. 1995. “Estimators and hypothesis tests for a stochastic frontier func-
tion: A Monte Carlo analysis.” Journal of Productivity Analysis, 6: 247–268.
Cuellar, Alison Evans, and Paul J. Gertler. 2003. “Trends In Hospital Consol-
idation: The Formation Of Local Systems.” Health Affairs, 22(6): 77–87.
Dafny, Leemore, and Subramaniam Ramanarayanan. 2012. “Does it Matter
if Your Health Insurer is For-Profit? Effects of Ownership on Premiums, Insurance
Coverage, and Medical Spending.” , (18286).
Dubin, Jeffrey A., and Daniel L. McFadden. 1984. “An Econometric Analy-
sis of Residential Electric Appliance Holdings and Consumption.” Econometrica,
52(2): 345–362.
Dunn, Abe. 2010. “The Value of Coverage in the Medicare Advantage Insurance
Market.” Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) working paper WP2010-11.
64
Feng, Ye, Don Fullerton, and Li Gan. 2005. “Vehicle Choices, Miles Driven,
and Pollution Policies.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
11553.
Fohlin, Caroline. 1998. “Relationship Banking, Liquidity, and Investment in the
German Industrialization.” The Journal of Finance, 53(5): 1737–1758.
Folland, Sherman T., and Richard A. Hofler. 2001. “How Reliable Are Hospital
Efficiency Estimates? Exploiting the Dual to Homothetic Production.” Health
Economics, 10(8): 683–698.
Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou. 1998. “The Effects of the Corporate Average Fuel
Efficiency Standards in the US.” The Journal of Industrial Economics, 46(1): 1–33.
Hall, Anne E. 2010. “Measuring the Return on Spending on the Medicare HMO
Program.” Federal Reserve Board.
Kumbhakar, Subal C., and C.A. Knox Lovell. 2000. Stochastic Frontier Anal-
ysis. Cambridge University Press.
Li, Tong, and Robert Rosenman. 2001. “Cost Inefficiency in Washington Hospi-
tals: A Stochastic Frontier Approach Using Panel Data.” Health Care Management
Science, 4: 73–81.
Maruyama, Shiko. 2011. “Socially Optimal Subsidiies for Entry: The Case of
Medicare Payments to HMOs.” International Economic Review, 52(1): 105–129.
Mazzeo, Michael J. 2002. “Product Choice and Oligopoly Market Structure.” The
RAND Journal of Economics, 33(2): pp. 221–242.
McGuire, Thomas G., Joseph P. Newhouse, and Anna D. Sinaiko. 2011.
“An Economic History of Medicare Part C.” Milbank Quarterly, 89(2): 289–332.
65
McKay, Niccie L., and Mary E. Deily. 2005. “Comparingi High- and Low-
Performing Hospitals Using Risk-Adjusted Excess Mortality and Cost Inefficiency.”
Health Care Management Review, 30(4).
McKay, Niccie L., Deily Mary E., and Fred H. Dorner. 2002. “Ownership
and Changes in Hospital Inefficiency, 1986-1991.” Inquiry, 39(4): 388–399.
Mello, Michelle M., Sally C. Stearns, and Edward C. Norton. 2002. “Do
Medicare HMOs still reduce health services use after controlling for selection bias?”
Health Economics, 11(4): 323–340.
Newhouse, Joseph P. 1970. “Toward a Theory of Nonprofit Institutions: An
Economic Model of a Hospital.” The American Economic Review, 60(1): pp. 64–74.
Ozcan, Yasar A., Luke Roice D., and Cengiz Haksever. 1992. “Ownership
and Organizational Performance: A Comparison of Technical Efficiency across
Hospital Types.” Medical Care, 30(9): 781–794.
Pauly, Mark, and Michael Redisch. 1973. “The Not-For-Profit Hospital as a
Physicians’ Cooperative.” The American Economic Review, 63(1): pp. 87–99.
Rosko, Michael D. 1999. “Impact of Internal and External Environmental Pres-
sures on Hospital Inefficiency.” Health Care Management Science, 2(2): 63–74.
Rosko, Michael D., and Ryan L. Mutter. 2008. “Stochastic Frontier Analysis
of Hospital Inefficiency.” Medical Care Research and Review, 65(2): 131–166.
Rosko, Michael D., and Ryan L. Mutter. 2010. “Inefficiency Differences be-
tween Critical Access Hospitals and Prospectively Paid Rural Hospitals.” Journal
of Health Politics, Policy and Law, 35(1): 95–126.
66
Seim, Katja. 2006. “An Empirical Model of Firm Entry with Endogenous Product-
Type Choices.” The RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3): pp. 619–640.
Seitz, Shannon. 2009. “Accounting for Racial Differences in Marriage and Employ-
ment.” Journal of Labor Economics, 27(3): pp. 385–437.
Sloan, Frank A. 2000. “Chapter 21 Not-for-profit ownership and hospital behav-
ior.” In . Vol. 1, Part B of Handbook of Health Economics, , ed. Anthony J. Culyer
and Joseph P. Newhouse, 1141 – 1174. Elsevier.
Small, Kenneth A., and Harvey S. Rosen. 1981. “Applied Welfare Economics
with Discrete Choice Models.” Econometrica, 49(1): pp. 105–130.
Starr, Paul. 1982. The Social Transformation of American Medicine. Basic Books.
Stephen Zuckerman, Jack Hadley, Lisa Iezzoni. 1994. “Measuring Hospital
Efficiency with Frontier Cost Functions.” Journal of Health Economics, 13(3): 255–
280.
Town, Robert, and Su Liu. 2003. “The Welfare Impact of Medicare HMOs.” The
RAND Journal of Economics, 34(4): pp. 719–736.
Vitaliano, Donald F., and Mark Toren. 1996. “Hospital Cost and Efficiency in




Table A.1: Summary Statistics
non-profit for-profit public
total costs ($M) 74.07 19.98 20.81
total admissions 15,845 10,958 3,488
costs/admission 5,260 2,913 6,410
beds 86 90 27
competing hospitals 2 5 1
CMI 1.357 1.346 1.213
population density 226 426 46
% teaching 29.5 8.1 13.1
% system 69.9 90.6 40.8
proportion of hospitals 50.08 27.40 22.52
proportion of beds 45.95 41.66 12.39
Table A.2: Summary Statistics - by Market Size
small medium large
total costs ($M) 15.8 54.5 103.5
total admissions 2,424 14,648 29,949
costs/admission 7,394 4,338 3,919
beds 25 83 136
competing hospitals 0 2 12
CMI 1 1 1
population density 27 196 1,519
% teaching 0.028 0.162 0.407
proportion of hospitals 33.30 33.41 33.30
proportion of beds 8.66 26.33 65.01
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Table A.3: Costs per Admission Matrix
small medium large
non-profit $ 7,918 $ 4,966 $ 4,345
for-profit $ 3,913 $ 2,656 $ 2,586
public $ 8,318 $ 4,684 $ 4,678
Table A.4: Multinomial Logit Coefficients







critical access -2.199*** -5.239***
(0.103) (0.414)



































System Dummy -0.00956 -0.00479
(0.0155) (0.0147)
Teaching Dummy 0.207*** 0.292***
(0.0193) (0.0128)
Missing Dummy (Labor Price) -0.0841*** -0.0893***
(0.0191) (0.0143)







Table A.6: Elasticities at Select Points
mean 25%ile median 75%ile
admissions 0.0339 0.0251 0.0310 0.0355
outpatients 0.0281 0.0202 0.0248 0.0291
price of capital 0.0164 0.0077 0.0128 0.0175





























Table A.8: Relative Efficiency Estimates
raw treated
small medium large small medium large
For Profit -.219*** -.239*** -.146*** -.340*** -.212** -.113
(.0324) (.0239) (.0249) (.00653) (.046) (.137)
Public -.084*** -.113*** -.0873** -.06** .107* -.149***
(.0198) (.0265) (.0367) (.0287) (.0588) (.0105)
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Table A.9: Comparison of Summary Statistics for Cawley, Chernew and McLaughlin (2005)
Variable N Mean S.D. Min Max N Mean S.D. Min Max
Number of HMOs Active in Medicare+Choice 27,666 0.44 1.09 0 10 3109 4.877131 3.310948 0 17
CMS payment (Per enrollee, per month) 27,666 391.44 88.85 168.15 881.35 3108 712.7514 69.91314 662.32 1367.41
Average Medicare Part A Costs 27,666 2,213.62 488.78 385.18 5,658.37 3108 4108.918 819.9329 954.8039 8828.268
Average Medicare Part B Costs 27,666 1,219.05 257.87 482.03 2,910.01 3108 3515.541 599.8412 1857.2 11909.18
Number of General Practitioner Medical Doctors 25,830 23.24 77.02 1 2,605 3108 28.57079 87.46201 0 2605
Number of Registered Nurses 27,324 617.35 2,004.18 1 52,780 3108 556.945 2063.832 0 49795
Number of Hospitals 22,617 2.6 5.23 1 148 3108 1.991956 4.194146 0 111
Number of HMOs Active in Commercial Market ?1,161 1.8 1.39 1 11
Per Capita Income 27,657 16,792.50 3,781.89 6,306 52,277 3108 30337.54 8119.889 8579 132728
Poverty Rate Among Elderly 27,603 0.17 0.083 0.01 0.58 3108 0.100793 0.040683 0.016253 0.372026
Median Rent 27,666 319.97 94.75 140 926 3108 440.7014 122.1515 206 1185
% Adults High School Graduates 27,666 69.54 10.34 31.6 95.5 3108 77.33536 8.72752 34.7 97
% Adults College Graduates 27,666 13.42 6.47 3.7 53.4 3108 16.50795 7.80015 4.9 63.7
Number of Medicare Beneficiaries 27,666 10,835.20 31,799.90 14 877581 3108 11496.53 32386.8 16 946076
% Growth in Medicare Beneficiaries 27,666 0.31 0.23 -0.31 2.98 3108 1.61511 2.345646 -12.8983 31.7316
Medicare Beneficiaries in Neighboring Counties 27,291 58,662.80 89,838.50 994 1,452,320 3108 64588.81 103954.2 760 1753293
% Growth of Medicare Beneficiaries in Neighboring Counties 27,291 0.327 0.17 -0.10 1.38 3108 1.767726 1.42425 -3.91215 11.80743
% Population Urban 20,691 48.28 23.81 0.1 100 3108 40.13652 30.92595 0 100
Population Density 27,666 208.53 1,439.40 0.2 53,801.10 3108 244.5411 1675.87 0.1 66940.1
% Workers in Manufacturing 27,639 18.58 10.54 0.4 53.6
% Workers White Collar 27,666 45.37 9.3 17.8 81.4 3108 35.36688 9.062371 13.58 76.05
Indicator: at Least One HMO Active in M+C 27,666 0.21 0.41 0 1
Market Penetration of HMOs into Medicare 15,369 0.05 0.09 0 0.58
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Table A.10: Firm Pool Statistics
mean median sd min max
Active Plans
All 4.479286 4 2.946508 0 15
Non-Profit 0.727852 0 1.181569 0 9
For Profit 3.751434 3 2.60392 0 13
Added Plans
All 6.16826 6 3.140994 0 26
Non-Profit 2.003505 2 1.25298 0 13
For Profit 4.164755 4 2.612946 0 18
Adjacent Counties 4.984704 5 3.206885 0 25
Top Firms 2.556087 2 1.37636 0 7
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Table A.11: Average Part C Payment by number of active plans


















Table A.12: Subsidiary Overlap for Parent Organizations
Parent Company Overlap with siblings Overlap with outside firms Ratio Siblings/Strangers
independent health association, inc. 3.33 0.14 23.16
blue cross of idaho health services, inc. 4.22 0.18 23.1
health alliance plan (hap) 4 0.17 22.96
blue cross and blue shield of massachusetts, inc. 5.5 0.24 22.58
aveta, llc. 42.5 2.04 20.85
presbyterian healthcare services 4 0.21 18.83
medica holding company 18.5 1.13 16.33
blue cross and blue shield of north carolina 5.5 0.34 16.05
university of pittsburgh medical center 4 0.35 11.57
blue cross and blue shield of minnesota 7 0.76 9.22
emblemhealth, inc. 4.5 0.75 6.01
mvp health care, inc. 1.78 0.32 5.52
highmark inc. 4.22 0.77 5.5
health net, inc. 4.44 1.08 4.12
blue cross blue shield of michigan 15 3.86 3.89
universal health care group, inc. 13 4.07 3.2
providence health & services 0.67 0.23 2.87
wellpoint, inc. 1.39 0.75 1.84
coventry health care inc. 1.07 0.63 1.71
aetna inc. 2.48 1.75 1.42
munich american holding corporation 8 5.65 1.42
america’s 1st choice holdings of florida, llc 0.5 0.37 1.35
kaiser foundation health plan, inc. 1.39 1.13 1.23
blue cross and blue shield of florida 0.25 0.2 1.23
unitedhealth group, inc. 1.08 0.93 1.16
humana inc. 2.87 2.59 1.11
wellcare health plans, inc. 0.5 0.53 0.94
arcadian management services inc. 0.38 0.44 0.84
medical card system, inc. 1 1.2 0.84
healthspring, inc. 0.2 0.28 0.7
scan health plan 0.22 0.35 0.64
universal american corp. 1.28 3.78 0.34
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Table A.13: Estimation Coefficients
Medicare Advantage Payment 5.759***
(0.4004)




Change in Enrollees -0.452***
(0.00564)


















Table A.14: Raw Summary Statistics for MCBS Access to Care module
Overall Medicare Medigap Medicare Advantage
Age 71.8 65.9 74.9 75.8
Income 19,766 13,217 24,506 20,574
Health 2.803 3.185 2.63 2.634
White 78.8% 66.5% 87.8% 73.4%
Black 9.5% 15.9% 5.1% 9.4%
Hispanic 7.6% 11.0% 3.9% 13.8%
Married 47.2% 29.0% 58.9% 49.4%
Veteran 23.9% 17.8% 28.1% 23.7%
Female 55.7% 53.9% 56.1% 59.0%
High School 69.4% 54.6% 79.0% 69.7%
College 25.0% 15.1% 31.7% 23.6%
Total 15769 35.20% 52.10% 12.70%
























Table A.16: Welfare Enhancement from Medicare Advantage
choice mean median max min
Medicare $474 $565 $1,631 $6
Medigap $654 $681 $1,386 $1
Medicare Advantage $675 $715 $1,542 $8




Figure B.1: Ownership Types and Population Density
Figure B.2: Per Patient Costs and Population Density
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Figure B.3: Per Patient Costs and Market Type
Figure B.4: Sample Hospital Locations
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Figure B.5: Regions used for Multinomial Logit Analysis
Figure B.6: Multinomial Results
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Figure B.7: Marginal Inefficiency of Ownership Types by Market Type
Figure B.8: Treated Hospital efficiency estimates by ownership and location
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Figure B.9: Raw and Treated Hospital efficiency estimates by ownership and location
Figure B.10: For-Profit and Public Hospital Innefficiency in Small Markets
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Figure B.11: Distribution of Active and Non-Active Plans
Figure B.12: Number of Active Firms in each County
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Figure B.13: Number of non-Active Plans in each County
Figure B.14: % of Firms that are Non-Profit by County
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Figure B.15: Relationship of Base Payments and Number of Plans
Figure B.16: Relationship of Base Payments and Ownership Composition
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Figure B.17: Actual vs. Predicted Number of Participants in each Market
Figure B.18: Actual vs. Predicted Number of For Profits in each Market
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Figure B.19: % of Beneficiaries enrolled in Medigap Plans (by Plan Letter)
Figure B.20: % of Beneficiaries enrolled in N Medigap Plans
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Figure B.21: Premiums paid by beneficiaries who have directly enrolled in a Medigap
Plan (by Plan Letter)
Figure B.22: Number of plans available to beneficiary
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Figure B.23: Price of Medicare Advantage plans (with a non-zero premium)
Figure B.24: Penetration of Medicare Advantage from December 2004-December
2005
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Figure B.25: Distribution of Risk Ratios by county
Figure B.26: Change in Consumer Surplus
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Figure B.27: Net Cost of Medicare Advantage (% increase relative to traditional
Medicare)
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